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Evidence of Iran’s desire to possess nuclear weapons grows regularly.  These 
facts outline Tehran’s extensive program and its efforts to keep the activities concealed.  
According to the National Council for Resistance in Iran, Tehran recently purchased 
blueprints for nuclear weapons from the Abdul Qadeer Khan proliferation network.1  
While the United States, Europe, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
struggle to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, recent proliferation cases, 
namely Pakistan and North Korea, suggest that states determined to build these weapons 
will ultimately be successful.2  Like Pakistan and North Korea, Iran is motivated in much 
the same manner, as stated by former Iran’s President Khatami in August, 1998: 
The strategic status of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the world and in the 
region and the Middle East, in particular, demands that we have a strong 
military capability.  We will not ask for anyone’s permission in order to 
strengthen our defense and military capabilities.  Defending oneself and 
deterring others from committing aggression is the most important right of 
every country.3 
According to this quote, there is no limit to what Iran will do to pursue security, 
no matter what outsiders think or do.  In a region of frequent conflict, nuclear weapons 
will be the ultimate guarantor of Iran’s security.   The newly elected President, Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad, has reiterated Tehran’s commitment to its nuclear program. 
Both Professors Ahmad Ghoreishi and Feroz Khan of the Naval Postgraduate 
School contend that once Tehran has nuclear weapons, it will have the capability to assert 
its will over non-nuclear states.4  The plethora of militarily weak states in the Arabian 
Gulf have no defense against a nuclear threat, except for intervention by the United 
                                                 
1 “Exiles: Iran Has Bomb Blueprints,” Associated Press, 18 November, 2005.  Taken from: 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,138824,00.html (Accessed 15 August 2005). 
2 Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, A Debate Renewed (New 
York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003), 38.   
3 Kori N. Schake and Judith S. Yaphfe, The Strategic Implications of a Nuclear-Armed Iran 
(Washington: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2001), vii. 
4 From separate discussions with Professors Ghoreishi and Khan at the Naval Postgraduate School, 
fall, 2005. 
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States.  Without U.S. protection, these states would be forced to either submit to Tehran 
or launch indigenous nuclear weapons programs.  Moreover, if a nuclear-armed Iran 
became aggressive, asserting its will on the region, the global economy could be 
negatively affected through worldwide concern over continued free flow of oil from the 
Arabian Gulf.   
Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons can further destabilize a historically unbalanced 
but globally vital region.  Social, military, and economic issues play key roles in 
maintaining a balance that is critical to the world’s economy.  Regional regime stability, 
security among the states, and control over respective territory and national resources are 
vital to the status-quo.  Adding Iranian nuclear weapons to this already stressful situation 
may prove perilous. 
President George W. Bush has stated simply that “We’ve made it clear, our 
position is that they (Iran) won’t have a nuclear weapon.”5  From this quote and the 
escalating rhetoric of the Bush Administration, an Iran with nuclear weapons is 
unacceptable to the security of the United States.  At first glance, this situation seems to 
demand instantaneous American military intervention to render Iran a non-threat.  
Immediately following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Tehran behaved in an unpredictable 
and often volatile manner towards its neighbors.  These actions took the form of 
attempting to export its Islamic fundamentalist revolution and supporting terrorists 
throughout the Middle East.  While Tehran has moderated its actions, becoming a status-
quo state following the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, the volatility of its past conduct 
implies that it cannot be trusted with nuclear weapons.  Also, Tehran’s possession of 
nuclear weapons could lead to a regional arms race in which nuclear weapons would 
rapidly proliferate and undermine global security.  This spiraling instability could lead to 
a violation of the nuclear taboo that has prevented these weapons from being used in 
combat since 1945 by the new nuclear states that may lack the safeguards against 
accidental use.  Finally, Tehran could expand its support to terrorists by providing them 
nuclear weapons.  Addressing how to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons has 
                                                 
5 “Bush: No Nuclear Iran on My Watch.” Associated Press, 28 September 2004.  Taken from: 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,133775,00.html  (Accessed 15 September 2005). 
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been widely covered in academic writings, but little attention has been paid to the 
regional impact of Iran’s nuclearization. 
This thesis assesses the reaction of Iran’s neighbors to its acquisition of nuclear 
weapons.  It bypasses the debate of how to prevent Iranian acquisition and instead 
focuses upon how Israel, the Arab Gulf States, and Pakistan will respond to Iran’s new 
capabilities.  This thesis assumes that Iran will gain a small, secure stockpile of nuclear 
weapons.  By studying the debate on the spread of nuclear weapons, the reasons Tehran 
desires them, how Iran’s neighbors will react, and the overall impact upon U.S. interests, 
one sees that the situation is not as unstable as might be imagined.  The United States 
must take steps, to deter Iran through establishing a coercive framework expanding 
America’s regional security guarantees.  This framework would limit the ability of Iran 
from behaving aggressively with its nuclear capabilities. 
It must be stressed from the beginning that this is only an initial study of this topic 
with a rather narrow scope.  Much has been written on the dangers and prevention of a 
nuclear-armed Iran, yet relatively little has been expressed on what the world would be 
like after Iran gains this capability.  This thesis has attempted to exhaust the most current 
unclassified documents related to Iran’s nuclear future.  More extensive studies that rely 
on open-source and classified work must be conducted.  Perhaps this work will provide 
the groundwork for such studies. 
Ray Takeyh, of the Council on Foreign Relations assesses that a nuclear-armed 
Iran would not employ its weapons in conflict, but would instead use them to increase its 
security against threats from America and other states.6  Since the inception of nuclear 
weapons over sixty years ago, these massively destructive weapons have shown that their 
greatest benefit is from the security gained from their possession, not their use.  One need 
only look at North Korea to see the benefits these weapons offer to outlaw states.  The 
international community has attempted unsuccessfully to bribe Pyongyang to halt 
uranium enrichment.  Similarly, in Iran, each time there is a crisis in the region, oil prices 
rise, with the net effect of enriching the regime and rewarding its actions.7  Instead of 
                                                 
6 Ray Takeyh, “Iran Builds the Bomb,” Survival 46 no. 4, (winter 2004-05), 53. 
7 “Oil Warning over Iran Nuclear Row,” BBC, 16 January, 2006.  Taken from: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4616320.stm (Accessed 25 January 2006). 
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buying off or directly preventing a state from going nuclear, the United States should 
weigh the costs and dangers of enflaming a whole society against us, particularly in such 
a critical region as the Arabian Gulf.   
This chapter asserts that a nuclear Iran may not be the security concern that it is 
commonly believed to be.  Second, this chapter examines the debate between those who 
believe that the proliferation of nuclear weapons provides security and those who argue 
that it worsens the global security.  Third, this chapter outlines the issues involved in 
Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, showing the unique historical role Iran has played in 
the region.  Finally, it outlines the structure and findings of each remaining chapter.   
B. BACKGROUND 
Significant tensions exist in the Middle East, ranging from potential civil war in 
Iraq to states dabbling with democratic reforms.  Throughout this range of activity, the 
vital output of oil is what draws the attention of the world.  In this uncertain environment, 
Iran has historically sought to be the regional arbiter of power.  With this tradition and 
being the most militarily powerful state in the region, Iran has the opportunity and ability 
to influence the outcomes of nearly any regional issue.  As Iran is the regional hegemon, 
understanding how it became capable of constructing nuclear weapons is worthy of 
study, for this will shed light on how Tehran intends to use them. 
International concerns toward Iran have centered on IAEA violations under the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).  As a NPT signatory, Iran pledged to not develop these 
weapons.  Yet the NPT allows Iran to develop a full fuel cycle to benefit from nuclear 
power and research.  This fuel cycle includes the enrichment of various radioactive 
elements for research purposes.  Repeatedly Iran has stressed this point to justify its 
research activities, though it does not account for recent infractions.  These infractions 
are at the core of the IAEA’s concerns. 
The secretive nature of Iran’s nuclear enrichment activities implies nefarious 
intent and undermines repeated claims from Tehran that its nuclear program is for power 
generation.  In 2004, the then U. S. Undersecretary of State for Non-Proliferation, John 
Bolton, raised concerns and stated that Iran’s nuclear program was nearing the point of 
  5
self-sufficiency.8  At that point, preventing Iran from producing nuclear weapons would 
be very difficult without attacking weapons production sites.   The net result is that 
eventually Iran’s nuclear weapons capability will be realized.   
While those in the United States, Europe, and the United Nations (UN) who argue 
that Iranian nuclear weapons would be a destabilizing threat and must be prevented, little 
study has been done on how these weapons will impact the region.  Any nuclear weapons 
that Tehran creates will most likely be employed in a deterrent role and not to be used 
against its neighbors in conflict.  Iran has become, and will likely remain, a status-quo 
state.  It works to avoid major military provocations, showing preference for working 
with governments over sub-state movements, a significant shift from the radical actions 
under Ayatollah Khomeini following the 1979 Islamic Revolution.9  Although President 
Ahmadinejad has made inflammatory statements about Israel, these have not lead to 
conflict and certainly would not be worth risking nuclear destruction from Israel’s alleged 
arsenal.  An overview of the debate over further proliferation of nuclear weapons is 
needed to understand fully the reasons Iran’s nuclear weapons might not be the cause for 
concern that many experts predict. 
C. DEBATE SURROUNDING THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR 
WEAPONS 
Owing to the vast destruction nuclear weapons can generate, they have ironically 
guaranteed security for the nations that possess them.  Any attack against a nuclear state 
carries the risk of provoking a devastating response.  Consequently, the benefits and 
dangers of nuclear weapon proliferation have been debated for decades.  Perhaps the 
most debatable point is whether more nuclear states advance or weaken world security.  
Naturally, this issue remains moot.  Yet, one must concede that the world has judiciously 
avoided the use of nuclear weapons for sixty years, suggesting the avoidance is 
                                                 
8 “Iran’s Nuclear Program Nears Self-Sufficiency” Summary of Iran Stories in Today’s Broadcasts, 
Radio Farda, 13 June 2004.  Taken from: 
http://www.radiofarda.com/transcripts/topstory/2004/06/20040613_1830_0046_0434_EN.asp  (Accessed 
03 February 2006). 
9 Daniel Byman, Shahram Chubin, Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Jerrold Green, Iran’s Security Policy in 
the Post-Revolutionary Era (Santa Monica: Rand, 2001), 100. 
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attributable to more than luck.  Professor Jan Breemer of the Navy War College asserts 
that at some point, luck loses its random nature and reflects skill.10 
1. Nuclear Optimists: “More May Be Better”11 
Nuclear Optimists advocate a gradual increase in the number of nuclear states.  
They argue that a cautious increase does not correspond to an increased likelihood that 
nuclear weapons will be used.  They further contend that this gradual spread is far better 
than if it were rapid or nonexistent.12  Supporters point to over sixty years in which 
deterrence helped prevent nuclear conflict.  According to Professor Kenneth Waltz of the 
University of California at Berkeley, “The world has enjoyed more years of peace since 
1945 than had been known in modern history.”13  Indeed, there has been no general war 
in this period, in spite of a variety of confrontations that could lead to rapid escalation 
and conflict.14  Instead nuclear weapons made nuclear war an unlikely possibility.15 
Professor Waltz argues that if deterrence produces the ideal, then the opposite 
must be correct: not having a clear balance of terror preventing a misstep leads to 
uncertainty of action by a state.  He states that defeated countries like Germany following 
World War II, which fought conventionally, will at the very worst survive with limited 
suffering.  Nuclear deterrence assures a totality of defeat; therefore, no rational actor will 
risk destruction.16  Instead of instability and uncertainty, nuclear weapons increase 
stability and certainty, making “miscalculation difficult and politically pertinent 
predictions easy.”17 
Despite this security, nuclear states must be cautious.  Professor Waltz examines 
both superpowers and smaller unpredictable states.  In all cases, nuclear weapons, with 
their extreme destructive power, induce caution.18  Even at the height of its revolutionary 
                                                 
10 Conversation with Dr. Breemer, Summer of 2005. 
11 Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 3. 
12 Ibid., 17.   
13 Ibid., 4.  
14 Ibid., 5.   
15 Ibid., 17.   
16 Ibid., 9. 
17 Ibid., 9. 
18Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 13. 
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zeal, an Iran with nuclear weapons would face the very real condition that if it employed  
its weapons, it would risk a devastating retaliation.  Since the Iranian regime is now 
pursuing the status-quo, the possibility that Tehran would risk such destruction is highly 
unlikely.   
Professor Waltz is not alone in his theory.  Additional study has been made on the 
stabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation.  Professor Peter Lavoy from the Naval 
Postgraduate School has predicted that nuclear weapons will prevent future wars between 
India and Pakistan.19  Although these two states have had minor conflicts that risked 
escalation to nuclear warfare, nuclear weapons provided a safety net that helped prevent 
escalation to general war.  Both Martin van Creveld of the Hebrew University in 
Jerusalem and Shai Feldman of Brandeis University maintain a nuclear-armed Middle 
East will stabilize the Arab-Israeli conflict.20  Israel will resist regional nuclear 
proliferation; however, as outlined in Chapter II, there is significant evidence showing 
direct military attacks against a state’s nuclear program does not deter it.  Quite the 
contrary, such attacks only further motivate states to pursue nuclear weapons. 
There is a negative side to the Optimists’ view.  The states that gain nuclear 
weapons may force their neighbors into crash nuclear-weapons programs to achieve 
balance.  This rapid proliferation could create a domino effect: In their haste to gain 
nuclear security, these states may not pay as close attention to command and control (C2) 
or security as states that have had decades to do so.  It is necessary to define C2 for the 
purposes of this thesis: Professor Feroz Khan of the Naval Postgraduate School states that 
the purpose of C2 systems are to “prevent peacetime nuclear operations from leading to 
nuclear war, especially in crises, and to carry out in wartime the missions assigned to 
nuclear forces.”21  He further defines an effective system guaranteeing the following: 
 Always function as directed and never when not directed 
                                                 
19 Peter R. Lavoy, “Civil-Military Relations, Strategic Conduct, and the Stability of Nuclear Deterrence 
in South Asia” Civil Military Relations and Nuclear Weapons (Stanford Center for International Security 
and Arms Control, June 1994). 
20 Martin van Creveld, Nuclear Proliferation and the Future of Conflict (New York: Free Press, 1993); 
and Shai Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence: A Strategy for the 1980s (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1982), 142-75 and 238. 
21 Feroz Kahn, “Nuclear Command-and-Control in South Asia during Peace, Crisis, and War,” 
Contemporary South Asia, 14, no. 2 (June 2005), 164.   
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 Fool-proof safety from accidents and accidental launches 
 A perfect system of accountability of nuclear and strategic 
materials 
 A system to prevent unauthorized access to the site, tampering or 
use of strategic materials 
 Assured retaliatory second-strike capability that the adversary must 
perceive as credible, which reduces the incentive to strike first 
during a crisis.22 
The lessons of history and rationality may apply.  Nuclear states, such as the former 
Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), with their differing views of 
civil government and militaries, never employed nuclear weapons. 23  Though Iran is 
potentially more unstable than either of these, it would be forced to proceed cautiously or 
receive more severe destruction that it could dispatch. 
2. Nuclear Pessimists: “More Will Be Worse”24 
On the opposite side of the proliferation debate, Nuclear Pessimists, argue that 
civilization has avoided destroying itself through accidents, missteps, and outright luck.  
Pessimists contend that the more states that possess these weapons the more likely they 
are to be used, it is only a matter of time.  Professor Scott Sagan of Stanford University 
advances two ideas to support this concept.  First, it is the military itself that will, through 
its modes of operation, bring about “deterrence failures and deliberate or accidental 
war.”25  Second, the certainty of civilian control over the weapons will be put at risk.  Dr. 
Sagan argues that the alternative for the uncertainty that comes from nuclear weapons 
could be replaced by deterrence through a hugely capable conventional bombing force.  
The organizational model of how militaries operate is central to Dr. Sagan’s 
argument.  First, the majority of military officers are viewed as more likely to see war as 
likely and inevitable.  From this basis, they are conditioned to be skeptical of any solution 
that does not include the use of force.  Second, these officers are indoctrinated to have 
only a limited idea of what constitutes victory.  This narrow scope of victory prevents the 
                                                 
22 Kahn, Nuclear Command-and-Control, 169-170.   
23 Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 15. 
24 Ibid., 47. 
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military from seeing the steps necessary for post-conflict resolution.  Instead they view 
only the defeat of the enemy as the end.  Third, the officers are biased toward taking the 
initiative offensively and decisively and do not reflect on the aftermath.  Fourth, the 
military does not possess the long-term considerations of a conflict, limiting its scope to 
the immediate objective.  Finally, officers focus solely upon their job, making them short 
sighted in the effects of their decisions. 
From these general organizational concepts, Professor Sagan specifically 
addresses the Iranian organizational structure of C2 for the Islamic Revolutionary Guards 
Corps (IRGC).  With the IRGC’s past history of acting beyond the scope of Tehran’s 
orders, it is possible that when Iran gains nuclear weapons, these weapons will not be 
completely under the control of the Iranian government.26  In such a situation nuclear 
weapons could potentially be used by forces that are more inclined than their political 
leaders to initiate a “better now than later” conflict.27 
The negative side of the Pessimists debate is that it is based upon theory without a 
factual basis to support its ultimate conclusions.  Certainly, there have been instances in 
which nuclear weapons have nearly been used in conflict, but the taboo against their use 
remains in place.  There could be a nuclear war, intended or otherwise tomorrow; 
however, history, and the threat that if there was the consequences would be vast, argues 
against it.  Nuclear conflict cannot happen through graduated steps─the weapons either 
have or have not been used.  Theorizing about what might happen because of societal, 
organizational, or institutional standards is useful for adding additional security to ensure 
that accidents do not happen.  On the other hand, these factors do not explain completely, 
with historical events to back them up, how the spread of nuclear weapons is inherently 
dangerous. 
3. Who is Right?  
In the case of Iran and its neighborhood, an argument can be made that Tehran’s 
acquisition of nuclear weapons might help stabilize the region.  When one accepts that 
Israel has possessed nuclear weapons for decades and Pakistan unveiled its capability in 
                                                                                                                                                 
25  Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 47. 
26 Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 62. 
27 Ibid., 61. 
  10
1998, the region seems capable of gradually accepting new nuclear states.  Since then, 
both nuclear states have dealt with serious conflicts and nuclear weapons have provided 
security.  To gain an understanding of how Iran will use its nuclear weapons, one can 
look briefly at how these nuclear states have used their weapons for security. 
For Israel, memories of the Holocaust will never diminish.  The quote “Never 
Again!” is reportedly welded on the side of the first Israeli nuclear bomb.28  These words 
summarize Israel’s commitment to never allow a second Holocaust.   
With India being Pakistan’s one, and apparently only foe, Pakistan faces a 
conventionally superior enemy, in both numbers and sophistication of weapons.  
Nevertheless, to date, Islamabad’s nuclear deterrent has proven suitable to defending that 
state from an otherwise more powerful enemy. 
States acquiring nuclear weapons one at a time and with significant time between 
them may seem fraught with danger and uncertainty.  However, Iran, as the most 
populous state in the region and the historical hegemon of the Arabian Gulf has lost its 
previous standing as regional arbiter to the United States.  Detracting further from Iran’s 
image, the United States has rapidly removed two bordering regimes.  Tehran cannot help 
but notice the capabilities of America’s armed forces and worry it could be next.  This 
concern could lead Iran to behave irrationally, causing its decision making to become 
unstable.  Nuclear weapons, with a clear C2 doctrine and regional deterrent relationships 
can garner Iran respect, domestic security, and the chance to add stability.  Stability, for 
the purpose of this thesis, is considered to be the removal of the threat of conflict and its 
corresponding devastation. 
D. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SITUATION 
Iran has been interested in nuclear weapons for nearly 50 years.  A research 
program began with reactors provided by the United States to Shah Muhammad Reza 
Pahlavi.29  These carried a back-door path to nuclear weapons for Iran.  However, as was 
allegedly the case with Israel, the United States ignored the activities of one of its few 
                                                 
28 Walter D. Farr, The Third Temple’s Holy of Holies (Air University: Maxwell Air Force Base, 1999), 
15. 
29 Sharon Squassoni, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Recent Developments (Washington: Congressional 
Research Service 2005), 1. 
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friends in the region.  The fact that Iran possesses huge petroleum and natural gas 
reserves did not seem to raise any serious concern as to why it needed to develop nuclear 
power for its energy needs.  In spite of the long period of time Iran has worked toward 
going nuclear, it is only recently it has become a serious concern to the United States.  
This point in Iran’s nuclear weapons program is exactly the wrong time for the United 
States to intervene.  Estimates vary over how close Iran is to self-sufficiency in its 
production of nuclear weapons materials.  Once self-sufficiency is reached, an entirely 
separate sanctions regime is needed, along with a multilateral approach to motivate 
Tehran to disavow these weapons.  To date, the international community has only 
succeeded in motivating Iran to halt refinement temporarily.  No indication exists that 
Tehran is seriously willing to disavow these weapons.  This action is in spite of 
proclamations about nuclear weapons being contrary to Islam.30 
1. Why Build a Bomb?  
Understanding the reasons why Iran desires nuclear weapons aids in assessing 
how it will behave as a nuclear state.  Nuclear weapons seem a natural extension of Iran’s 
military policy, given its historical management of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD).  The wholesale slaughter of the Iran-Iraq War is still fresh in the minds of all 
Iranians, particularly in light of America removing the Iraqi regime and occupying Iraq.  
Iran cannot help but fear a renewed conflict with Iraq upon America’s withdrawal.  One 
should expect that a counter to threats by neighboring states’, real or imagined, would be 
sought.  When one considers the cost-benefit ratio of nuclear weapons and Iran’s severe 
economic problems, nuclear weapons provide stable, assured security at a fraction of the 
cost, making them highly attractive to Tehran. 
Exploring the reasons Iran wants nuclear weapons helps one understand how its 
neighbors will react.  Iran only reluctantly employed chemical weapons against Iraq in 
response to Baghdad’s wholesale use of them.  Iranian mullahs, citing religious 
teachings, were loath to violate what they believed were Islamic commands against such 
                                                 
30 “Fatwa Restrains Iran More on Nuclear Weapons Than Treaty: Negotiator.” Associated Foreign 
Press, 12 April 2005.  Taken from: http://www.spacewar.com/2005/050412130710.kizyij2s.html (Accessed 
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weapons.31  As a consequence of this ruling, all WMD programs in Iran were abandoned 
following the 1979 revolution.32  As a result, the country was unprepared when Iraq 
initiated the use of chemical weapons, in spite of Baghdad’s public statements 
announcing its intent to employ these weapons in July of 1982.33  
Disinterest in Iran’s suffering by the international community further motivated 
its pursuit of WMD.  Initially, Tehran sought outrage from a variety of world bodies over 
the introduction of chemical weapons to the battlefield, citing Baghdad’s membership in 
the Geneva Protocols of 1925 prohibiting their use.  These concerns fell on largely 
unsympathetic ears, even when Tehran sent victims to the UN.  The only response was a 
watered-down resolution that did nothing to inhibit the use of chemical weapons.34  The 
resulting scores of casualties no doubt led the regime to adopt a “never again” attitude 
toward autonomy and a desire for self-sufficiency in being able to produce WMD 
indigenously.  These lessons were enunciated by Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, prior to 
becoming Iran’s President, in the Majiles (parliament), in October of 1988: 
With regard to chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons 
training, it was made very clear during the war that these weapons are very 
decisive.  It was also made very clear that the moral teachings of the world 
are not very effective when war reaches a serious state; the world does not 
respect its own resolutions, and closes its eyes to the violations and all the 
aggressions which are committed on the battlefield.  We should fully 
equip ourselves in the defensive and offensive use of chemical, 
bacteriological, and radiological weapons.35 
Considering the statements and actions by Iran’s new President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, 
Tehran seems all the more likely to pursue these weapons. 
2. Internal Uncertainty  
In spite of demonstrations expressing widespread public support, not all Iranians 
desire to have nuclear weapons.  There is growing public debate within the country over 
                                                 
31 Gregory F. Giles, “The Islamic Republic of Iran and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons,” 
in, Planning the Unthinkable, How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons, ed. 
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32 Ibid., 81. 
33 Dillip Hiro, The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict (London: Routledge, Chapman, & 
Hall, 1989), 86. 
34 Giles, Iran and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons, 81-2. 
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this topic.  Moderates inside the country look to states that have the means of assembling 
weapons on short notice.  These moderates feel a hedging capability is sufficient to 
secure the state.  Apparently, so far, Iran has maintained this course to the outside world, 
not declaring its intent to build nuclear weapons, but insisting, rightly so, that under the 
NPT it has the right to undertake enrichment and research activities.36  
Unfortunately for those against Iranian acquisition, the state has an inflated sense 
of self-importance.  Average Iranians believe their country is a regional power based on 
their religion, location, resources, and population.  This view, however, does not mesh 
with reality, as stated by Michael Eisenstadt of the Washington Institute’s Military and 
Security Studies Program:  
Most Iranians also believe that their country is a regional power by dint of 
geography, demography and resource endowments.  There is a large gap, 
however, between the self-image and the aspirations of the regime, and the 
reality of Iran’s military weakness.37 
Just as Americans take pride in the Revolution of 1776, Iranians identify with Cyrus the 
Great from 559 B.C. believing their culture to be powerful due to its roots.  Furthermore, 
Iranians believe they are the real leaders of the Muslim world, the historical arbiters of 
the Arabian Gulf.  Regrettably, these assertions suffer from an acute gap between 
capabilities and aspirations.  Given the profound financial problems that plague the 
regime, nuclear weapons are seen as the only means to bridge this gap without shattering 
the economy.38   
3. Are Nuclear Weapons Needed?  
The answer to whether or not Iran actually needs weapons provides insight toward 
how it will align its nuclear weapons policy.  One needs only to consult a map to see that 
Iran is in a bad neighborhood.  Pakistan, with its Sunni majority and nuclear weapons 
poses at least a minimal threat to Iran―in spite of the fact Islamabad would be unable to 
hold off India while attacking Iran, and there is nothing territorially that either could 
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desire on the Baluchistan frontier that lies between them.  Even though both nations are at 
odds over the future of Afghanistan, there is almost nothing that could lead to outright 
conflict.  Turkey, as a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member with close 
ties to the United States and Israel, provides a potential avenue of approach for a 
preventative/preemptive strike on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, should Jerusalem launch 
such a strike.  In addition, the United States has, in the past, stored nuclear weapons in 
Turkey, something that is likely not ignored by Tehran.  Israel has the ability to attack 
Iran with ballistic and, potentially, sub-launched cruise missiles.  This, in addition to 
Jerusalem’s willingness to pursue its security at any cost, justifies Tehran’s concerns.  
Iraq, currently under United States occupation pending regime stabilization, serves as an 
ever present reminder of the slaughter during the 80s; and even with the likelihood that 
Iraq’s Shi’a majority will take power, hatred remains.  In Afghanistan, a long hated rival 
of Iran under the Taliban, now has Coalition troops supporting Hamid Karzai.  Iran is a 
traditional highway for smugglers of Afghanistan’s opium crop, bringing clashes with 
drug traffickers every year.   
This apparent encirclement of Iran enhances Tehran’s paranoia, especially when 
other states are allowed to possess nuclear technology while Iran is not.  The history of 
Iran being abandoned by the international community to stand alone against WMD 
provides sufficient justification, in Tehran’s mind, for a nuclear program.  In terms of 
facing punishment from the international community, the case of Pakistan is most 
applicable as a comparison to Iran.  Islamabad went ahead with its nuclear activities in 
full knowledge of, and in spite of, international aversion to its tests.  Today, Pakistan is a 
major non-NATO ally of the United States with economic and military aid being lavished 
upon it.  This is hardly a deterrent from opposing international norms.  Consequently, it is 
logical for modern Iran to follow a realist approach and attempt to balance threats, real or 
imagined, to its security.  Nuclear weapons can level the playing field and bring security 
within the anarchic international system.  Tehran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, however, 
ignores the fact that these supposed threats do not afford sufficient reason to attack Iran 
arbitrarily, nor would nuclear weapons necessarily provide security from Iran’s perceived 
threats.  External perception, however, is irrelevant, for Iran believes what it believes. 
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The ruling regime in Tehran seeks to maintain the regional status-quo.  In recent 
times, the country again and again sought only to maintain the current state of affairs 
through defensive actions and mobilizations, not overt attacks.  Far from seeking conflict, 
Tehran has striven to avoid appearing belligerent.  Iran’s relative neutrality in all three 
recent conflicts (DESERT STORM, ENDURING FREEDOM, and IRAQI FREEDOM) 
supports this.  Nuclear weapons, given Iran’s enemies nuclear capability and/or 
conventional superiority, offer passively balance these threats, with only moderate cost, 
without directly threatening them in return.   
Weapons control is the largest cause for international concern.  There are 
significant C2 issues that bring the region serious anxiety.  These concerns focus on 
Tehran’s institutional paranoia.  Following the revolution, a number of ambiguous 
military organizations were created to oversee the actions of traditional armed forces.  
Most notoriously independent of these is the IRGC.  The IRGC has a history of not 
following Tehran’s dictates.  Instead, it has operated for its own ends on a number of 
occasions.  Professor Scott Sagan observes that the IRGC is prone to initiate operations 
beyond the relatively defensively minded central government in Tehran.  This 
unpredictability is great cause for apprehension as Professor Sagan points out.  The IRGC 
has a penchant for acting beyond the orders of Tehran, such as chemical weapons during 
the Iran-Iraq War.  These independent actions could lead to similar situations, if nuclear 
weapons were placed in the IRGC’s control, and given its historical control of WMD, the 
control of nuclear weapons is likely to fall to the IRGC.39  A lack of centralized C2 and 
the unlikely ability of the theocratic infrastructure to prevent the unintended use of such 
weapons by these irregular forces threatens regional stability.   How this threat will be 
solved is not easily answered. 
4. Atoms for Terrorists?  
Owing to the unique nature of nuclear weapons, the question is regularly raised 
whether or not Tehran will allow an uncertain entity, such as the IRGC or Iranian 
sponsored terrorists, to gain access to nuclear weapons.   This question misses the point 
that these weapons bring the potential of a catastrophic response on the part of any state 
they target.  Imagine if Iran provided a nuclear weapon to one of its terrorist proxies, 
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Hezbollah for example.  If that terrorist group were to use that weapon to destroy a city in 
Israel, Jerusalem would immediately discern the supplier and not hesitate to remove the 
threat once and for all.   
Tehran relies upon the IRGC to ensure regime survival.  However, granting 
release authority to this lower echelon unit without an immediate threat is inconsistent 
with how C2 that such weapons require.  Such an uncertainty of action with nuclear 
weapons invites gross instability.  In fact, not possessing sound C2 over these weapons 
suggests a level of volatility that has not been seen in Iran for some time.  Iran would 
likely keep these weapons close to home for regime survival, or at least in very secure 
locations.  Turning even one weapon over to a terrorist organization─with Iran’s 
relatively defensive stance─would be very unlikely.  Had Tehran wanted to terrorize 
states in the region with WMD, they would only have had to arm terrorists with chemical 
or biological weapons.  The possession of nuclear weapons holds a mystique and 
prestige, yet the consequences of misuse are tremendous.  The costs of construction and 
the prestige that accompanies nuclear ownership in the international community are so 
significant that a state would not lightly place these weapons in the hands of 
unpredictable entities.  Furthermore, these same reasons explain why Iran would ensure 
security over its precious arsenal, preventing them from falling into third-party hands.  
The fact that Tehran has not yet passed along WMD, lends weight to the argument that it 
will not change this policy for nuclear weapons.   
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This thesis analyzes the reaction of key players in the region, the reaction of 
nuclear states, such as Israel and Pakistan, to a nuclear-armed Iran.  Naturally, this 
situation carries with it serious, though separate, security issues to each.  The two states’ 
reactions will go far in determining the impact of a nuclearlized Iran upon regional 
security.  Iran must step cautiously in its actions due to both states nuclear weapons.  To 
be sure, these states will have to deal with the same, non-nuclear threats that Iran 
represents, but all parties involved will tread lightly in these affairs, avoiding nuclear 
brinkmanship.   
In addition to a detailed analysis of Israel and Pakistan, this thesis considers the 
reaction of the Arab Gulf States in relation to a nuclear-armed Iran.  Although Israel and 
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Pakistan are capable of deterring Iran by themselves with a deterrence understanding, 
Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates have much to 
fear.  This fear, on the other hand, need not cripple the militarily weaker states. This 
thesis argues Iran presents no critical nuclear threat to the region or the world.  
Deterrence between Iran and its neighbors will remove serious security obstacles and 
stabilize the region.  Stability, for the sake of this thesis, is defined as the regional states, 
with the aid of the United States, being able to keep Iran relatively limited in its ability to 
disrupt the regional status-quo.  This will be conducted through a regional deterrence 
relationship that even the fiercest revolutionaries in Tehran will understand.  For Tehran, 
deterrence is not a difficult concept to understand: In return for nuclear adventurism, Iran 
risks nuclear destruction and the end of its bid for dominance over the Muslim world. 
This thesis accepts the Nuclear Optimist point of view.  A nuclear Iran, equipped 
with a clearly defined C2 structure, will not destabilize the Arabian Gulf Region.  Iran 
cannot be stopped from constructing nuclear weapons.  The more nations try to deter it 
from this course, the more Tehran is convinced of the need for these weapons, and the 
less likely it is to behave rationally.  A better course for the United States to follow would 
be allowing Tehran its nuclear weapons, and use the resources that would have been 
wasted on preventing Iranian nuclearization to improve military ties in the region. 
1. Israel 
Chapter II addresses Israel’s likely reaction to Iranian nuclear weapons.  It must 
be stressed that no confirmed evidence exists that proves Israel possesses nuclear 
weapons.40  Israel’s historical relations with Iran have been fairly warm.  The two are 
united in resistance to Arab hatred, the 1979 revolution notwithstanding.  As the only 
state in history to launch a preventative strike, Israel must decide whether or not to strike 
Iran’s program and deployment sites.  Lack of intelligence, scattered locations, and 
uncertainty of 100 percent success will prevent a strike from being launched. 
The likely outcome is that Israel and Iran will enjoy a more stable relationship 
through mutual deterrence.  Iran’s greatest reason for building nuclear weapons is to 
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counter those of Israel and the United States.  With a secure stockpile of weapons, Tehran 
will be able to relax its concerns of being attacked.  This stability could possibly 
encourage Palestinian statehood and end Iranian-sponsored terrorism in Israel.  Some of 
the key issues that must be addressed are whether Israel will strike Iran’s nuclear 
facilities, how nuclear weapons will impact Iran’s support to anti-Israeli terrorists, and 
how mutual deterrence can develop between the two. 
2. The Arab Gulf States  
Chapter III addresses how Iranian nuclear weapons will impact issues between 
Iran and Arab states in the Arabian Gulf.  Several of these states are capable of 
developing indigenous nuclear weapons program.  This possibility counters the Nuclear 
Optimist school, for states must have time to consider the impact of their program.  The 
Arab world has traditional pressed for a nuclear-free Middle East, yet in the face of a 
nuclear Iran, this will be difficult to maintain.   
Traditionally, the Arab Gulf States have been militarily weak, particularly in the 
face of Iran and Iraq.  With the destruction of the Iraqi military in Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, Iran is the preeminent power in the neighborhood.  Only the United States’ 
presence deters Iranian adventurism.  All of the Arab Gulf States are dependent on 
outsiders providing security.  Since 1971, this has been the role of the United States.  In 
the face of a nuclear Iran, this role will probably increase.  Ideally, Iraq will return to its 
previous position as the buffer between Iran and the other Gulf States, and Baghdad will 
remain a wild card, for with such military strength, Iraq could return to its oppressing 
ways.  Key issues between the Gulf Arab States and Iran are nuclear proliferation by 
these states, the role of Islam in the region, Iranian support of Shi’a insurgents in each of 
the Arab Gulf States, economic problems, and geographic issues in dispute. 
3. Pakistan  
Chapter IV addresses how Pakistan will react to Iranian nuclear weapons.  
Pakistan’s military, both nuclear and conventional, is primarily occupied with India.  
They are ill-suited to stand against an Iran that is developing close military and economic 
ties to India.  This relationship between India and Iran reduces the likelihood that a 
conflict between Pakistan and Iran will ensue, since Islamabad can use its nuclear 
weapons to deter any belligerency. 
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Islamabad and Tehran continue to grow further apart, but nothing suggests that 
either is interested in conflict, especially with the potential for nuclear exchange.  Instead 
Pakistan will likely tacitly accept Iran’s becoming a nuclear state.  This understanding 
requires a deterrent relationship in which both sides understand the risks involved.  Key 
issues between Pakistan and Iran are the unfolding events in Afghanistan, growing ties 
between Iran and Indian, the involvement by the PRC, as well as C2 issues regarding 




































































II. ISRAELI REACTION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Israeli fighters had flown for nearly ninety minutes in enemy territory, 
remaining at about 100 feet to avoid detection.  Completely surprising the Iraqis, the 
eight F-16’s delivered sixteen, 2,000-pound bombs, functionally destroying their target, 
thereby Israel rolled back Saddam Hussein’s nuclear bomb program by three or four 
years.  In terms of resources expended on the facility, the time lost by the Israeli attack 
far exceeded the financial cost of the facility.  “Battlefields wax and wane in combat, but 
lost time is irreplaceable.”41  Having taken five years to assemble, the reactor was 
knocked out within ninety seconds.  The day after the strike, Iraq was years away from 
creating a nuclear weapon.42 
By executing Operation BABYLON, Israel effectively, albeit temporarily, 
destroyed Iraq’s nuclear weapons production capability.  The preventative strike was the 
culmination of years of overt and covert actions by Israel.  Operations involving political, 
military, and diplomatic efforts were conducted in an effort to secure the Jewish State 
from Iraq prior to the attack.  Though successful in delaying Iraq, these failed where 
BABYLON succeeded.  The gain of time to prepare defenses was important to Israeli 
security; however, this attack would not stop Jerusalem’s enemies from pursuing nuclear 
weapons.  
Today, Israel understands that a similar operation against Iran would not be as 
easy to execute, nor will it gain as much time from the strike to continue development of 
defenses.  Eliot Cohen of the Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at 
Johns Hopkins University has stated: “The days of Osirak-type raids on a single, easily 
located, and above-surface nuclear facility are over.  Secrecy, camouflage, deception and 
dispersion will make preemption a far more extensive and uncertain operation than ever 
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before.”43  Similarly pragmatic, Ehsaneh Sadr, of the University of Maryland’s 
department of Government and Politics, asserts that “it is necessary to consider whether 
the costs and opportunities associated with the emergence of a nuclear Iran might not be 
more tolerable than those associated with military action.”44 
The time gained by BABYLON did not remove the Iraqi nuclear threat-only 
Operation DESERT STORM completely stopped Iraq’s program.  The most significant 
development during the time gained was the Arrow anti-missile system.  Although state-
of-the-art, Arrow only offers protection against ballistic missiles and Israel remains open 
to other kinds of nuclear attack.45  Considering this lack of certainty, Jerusalem probably 
has serious doubts about future strikes.   
Israel’s reaction to a nuclear Iran carries the greatest potential of conflict.  This is 
based on Israel’s past actions to ensure survival, its military capabilities, Iran’s verbal 
threats, and Jerusalem’s statement that a nuclear-armed Iran is “unacceptable.”46   
Reemphasizing Israel’s willingness to act against threats to Israel, acting Prime Minister 
Olmert stated: “Under no circumstances, and at no point, can Israel allow anyone with 
theses kinds of malicious designs against us [to] have control of weapons of destruction 
that can threaten our existence.”47 
This chapter examines how Israel could react to Iran’s acquisition of nuclear 
weapons.  First, the chapter outlines the debate within Israel surrounding a nuclear-armed 
Iran.  Second, the chapter evaluates each option Israel has, showing that a repeat of 
BABYLON is unlikely against Iran.  The chapter also asserts that a mutually deterring 
relationship will likely be reached through a sub rosa understanding.  Finally, this chapter 
assesses the impact of Israel’s likely reaction on U.S. interests. 
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B. INTERNAL DEBATE 
The gravity of a nuclear-armed Iran is being debated in Israel.  Central to the 
debate is the possibility of a military strike similar to BABYLON.   Issues in this debate 
include obstacles to a successful strike, the dubious benefits from such an attack, and the 
potential of Iran supplying nuclear weapons to terrorists.  The shared history of Iran and 
Israel plays a role behind the scenes, along with Tehran’s nuclear motives.  The net 
assessment shows Iran, fearing retaliation, is unlikely to use nuclear weapons against 
Israel and thereby is not a threat to Israel’s existence.  
1. To Strike or Not to Strike 
Israelis arguing against an attack focus on Iran’s nuclear motives and that 
removing its capabilities would be difficult and ultimately unlikely to dissuade Iran from 
rebuilding them.  A nuclear Iran would be the first enemy in Israel’s history that 
possessed the capability to destroy the Jewish state.  In spite of this capability, it is 
doubtful that Iran would choose to employ it, for with Israel’s assumed nuclear 
capabilities, Iran would pay a heavy price for doing so.  There is no indication that 
Tehran is willing to accept that level of destruction to eradicate Israel. 
a. Not Worth the Trouble 
There are three prime reasons against military action, as asserted by its 
opponents.  First, Ephraim Kam of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies in Tel Aviv 
asserts that Iran’s motive for nuclear weapons is defensive-deterrent in nature.48  The 
weapons would provide state security, to be used only for regime survival.  This suggests 
that by attacking, Israel would force Tehran into a use-or-lose situation.  Second, 
American nuclear deterrence and conventional strength is fully capable of deterring Iran 
from attacking Israel.  This assurance was reaffirmed by President Bush in 2003: 
“America is firmly committed to the security of Israel as a Jewish, state and we are firmly 
committed to the safety of the Israeli people.”49  Iran would think twice before striking 
Israel, given the United States’ response.  Finally, Iran’s progress in terms of its nuclear 
production might also factor into Jerusalem’s decision to strike.  After initial construction 
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of a handful of weapons, Israel may think Iran is still vulnerable to a preemptive attack.  
This period offers the greatest risk when one side (Israel) is ceding its nuclear monopoly 
while another (Iran) struggles to build a secure stockpile.  Israel may decide that it has the 
opportunity to destroy Iran’s capabilities prior to maturity.  However, since Israel will 
likely not act before Iran goes nuclear, it is even more unlikely to act afterward, risking 
potential nuclear retaliation.  
The prospect of Tehran providing nuclear weapons to terrorists is one of 
the debate’s largest issues.  As stated in Chapter I, no evidence exists that shows Iran 
intends to give nuclear weapons to such radical organizations.  Iran’s nuclear weapons 
will sustain its support of the status-quo and build security to balance outside threats.50  
This security and stability are not aided by supporting irrational actors who might misuse 
Iran’s nuclear weapons.  States historically have not borne the expense of acquiring 
nuclear weapons simply to sell or supply them to others.  Finally, since Iran has never 
provided terrorists with WMD, suggests it will continue this policy, particularly in the 
case of nuclear weapons.   
Perhaps the most telling reason not to attack Iran’s nuclear sites is 
reflected by the actual results of the Osirak attack.   Quite simply, the attack did not stop 
Iraq.  As Sammy Salama and Karen Ruster of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies 
point out: 
Contrary to popular belief, it appears that Israel's attack on Osirak in June 
of 1981 did nothing to hinder Iraq's nuclear aspirations. Although it 
temporarily set back its capabilities, it served rather to reinforce and 
increase Saddam's desire for a nuclear arsenal. In fact, Iraqi nuclear 
scientist Imad Khadduri claims that Israel's preemptive strike against the 
French-built Tamuz Iraqi nuclear reactor, which was not really suitable for 
plutonium production anyway, had the exact opposite effect of the one 
intended: It sent Saddam Hussein's A-bomb program into overdrive and 
convinced the Iraqi leadership to initiate a full-fledged nuclear weapons 
program immediately afterwards.51 
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Khidar Hamza, one of Saddam Hussein’s leading nuclear scientists stated 
in an interview with CNN in February, 2003: 
Israel actually, what Israel [did] is that it got out the immediate danger out 
of the way. But it created a much larger danger in the longer range. What 
happened is that Saddam ordered us-we were 400-scientists and 
technologists running the program. And when they bombed that reactor 
out, we had also invested $400 million. And the French reactor and the 
associated plans were from Italy. When they bombed it out, we became 
7,000 with a $10 billion investment for a secret, much larger underground 
program to make bomb material by enriching uranium. We dropped the 
reactor out totally, which was the plutonium for making nuclear weapons, 
and went directly into enriching uranium.  They [Israel] estimated we'd 
make 7kg of plutonium a year, which is enough for one bomb. And they 
get scared and bombed it out. Actually it was much less than this, and it 
would have taken a much longer time. But the program we built later in 
secret would make six bombs a year.52 
Based upon this evidence of the Iraqi response to BABYLON, a strike 
against an Iran is simply a case of sacrificing the future security of Israel for the present. 
b. Necessary for Security 
One principal argument exists to support attacking Iran: Any enemy with 
nuclear weapons is unacceptable to Israel.  These supporters point out that Israel’s future 
security will always be in question, should Iran gain the ability to destroy it.  Israel 
should strike before it loses the opportunity to do so. 
An Israeli attack would face a long list of challenges.  First, Iran expects 
the attack and surprise will be difficult to achieve.  Second, the sites are numerous and 
distant.53  Third, the route to and from the targets would require some U.S. coordination, 
something America is unlikely to want to be involved in due to the likely outrage in the 
Muslim world.  Fourth, Iran would likely recreate any facilities destroyed, building 
deeper to prevent future attacks from being effective.  Fifth, the number and dispersal of 
the sites makes it difficult to strike and to assess success rapidly to determine the need for 
additional attacks.  Any such delay gives Iran an opportunity to react with any surviving 
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weapons.  Sixth, even if all its nuclear weapons were destroyed, Iran could use chemical 
weapons to retaliate, wreaking havoc throughout Israel.  Finally, significant intelligence 
gaps exist on the targets, so the Israelis could not be certain that all Iranian sites are 
accounted for.54 
c. Fallout 
The results of an attack must also be considered.  Time would be the 
greatest benefit, if the strike went successfully.  Iran would probably rapidly rebuild.  
Further, those in Iran who do not support nuclearization would likely shift their beliefs.  
Lastly, Israel would only be able to watch as Iran rebuilt its program, as there is little in 
the way of additional defenses the Israelis could develop.   
Israel would face diplomatic repercussions aside from any Iranian 
retaliation.  While neighboring Muslim states would be relieved that Iran was removed as 
a nuclear threat, the attack would be seen as a Zionist attack against the Muslim world.  
U.S. involvement, real or imagined, would lead to serious problems.55  
2. Israeli/Iranian Issues 
Iran and Israel have historically been something between acquaintance and 
adversary.  Both states are non-Arab in a region of Arab states.  Also, in a region 
dominated by Sunni Muslims, each is home to a minority religion.  During the Iran-Iraq 
war, Israel provided arms to Iran, supporting what was then perceived as a distant threat.  
Because Saddam was seeking sophisticated WMD, Iraq was seen as the greatest threat to 
Israel at the time.  This Israeli aid was also intended to buy safety for the Jews in Iran, 
which has significant Jewish communities in Tehran and Shiraz.56   
Israel’s military support for Iran did not make the two nations friends; animosity 
soared after the 1979 Islamic revolution.  In 1982 a struggle ensued when Iran dispatched 
1,500 IRGC troops to Lebanon to help Lebanese Muslims against Israel’s invasion.57  
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Iran has supported Hezbollah, a terrorist group that operates from Lebanon, conducting 
regular rocket attacks against Israel with weapons, money, and troops.  The two states 
have recently escalated their rhetoric, but there is no real reason to return to open warfare. 
To this day, the two states remain intertwined.  The Economist recently stated: 
It is an irony that Israel’s president, Moshe Katzav, is in fact a Farsi-
speaker born in Iran.  Ditto Israel’s defence minister, Shaul Mofaz, who is 
doubtless preoccupied nowadays with how to destroy Iran’s nuclear 
programme.  He is advised by Dan Halutz, Israel’s former air-force 
commander and now chief of staff.  Lieut-General Halutz was born in 
Israel, both his parents in Iran.  They seem to have taught him a sense of 
humour.  Asked how far Israel would go to stop Iran’s nuclear 
programme, he replied: “two thousand kilometers.”58 
Sense of humor aside, this article articulates how close the two countries remain, in spite 
of recent inflammatory rhetoric.  These ties should not be mistaken for friendship, yet 
there is common ground that both states share, paving the way for an understanding about 
Tehran’s nuclear weapons. 
a. Going Nuclear 
Balancing Israel’s alleged nuclear capabilities is Iran’s key reason for 
nuclearization.  The weapons will be used as part of a national policy centering on Israel, 
as outlined by Iranian Minister of Defense Admiral Ali Shamkhani: 
Iran’s defense strategy is based on safeguarding Iran’s territorial integrity 
and interests, preventing the creation of a strategic vacuum in the region, 
and working for regional integration…and deterring threats…. The main 
threat comes from Israel and [the United State] Iran’s defense capabilities 
constitute part of the defense power of the Islamic countries and will only 
be used as a deterrent force in defense of the Islamic ummah (community). 
59 
It is of no consequence that Israel has not publicly announced its nuclear 
capabilities; the Iranians are convinced that Israel is a nuclear state.  According to the 
Federation of American Scientists, Israel has a large stockpile of weapons, somewhere  
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between one and two hundred, with varying levels of sophistication and delivery 
methods. 60  Iran remains within the NPT while Israel never signed it.  Iran’s President 
Khatami noted in 1998: 
It is ironic that those who are so concerned about saving humanity from 
nuclear weapons fully support Israel which is a nuclear power and is 
unwilling to join the NPT or accept IAEA safeguards, while leveling 
allegations against Iran, which has not even been able to complete its first 
nuclear power plant, which began before the revolution.  These are all 
pretexts for imposing certain policies on Iran and the region and to create 
panic and mistrust.  We are not a nuclear power and do not intend to 
become one.  We have accepted IAEA safeguards and our facilities are 
routinely inspected by that agency.61 
President Khatami had a valid point.  Iran feels unfairly treated in the face 
of unjust punishments by the IAEA while Israel has been given a free pass by the 
international community.  Iran naturally looks to its own devices for security, especially 
given its history with the international community’s lax response toward Iraq’s use of 
WMD against it. 
Israel aside, nationalism and desire for prestige is perhaps a greater reason 
for Iran to seek these weapons.  Nuclear weapons tie into what makes a state a great 
power.  All permanent members of the United Nations Security Council have them.  
Economic powers such as Japan and Germany are latent states, possessing the ability to 
rapidly assemble them.  Lastly, recent proliferators such as India, Pakistan, and North 
Korea have hardly suffered.  Instead, these states enjoy recognition and reward.  The sum 
of this leads Iran to believe it needs these weapons. 
Realistically, it can be deduced that the immediate and specific threat to 
Israel from a nuclear-armed Iran is not significant, since nuclear states tend not to use 
their weapons.  This theoretical discussion, however, does not mitigate the threat from the 
Israeli point of view.  Jerusalem is unlikely to accept mere theory to prevent a second 
Holocaust.  Hence it must do something.  There is an array of options open, and history  
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suggests that Israel will be cautious and hesitate committing to one option until events 
require it.  Prior to outlining the options open to Israel, a study of the animosity between 
both states is warranted. 
3. Issues with Iran 
To Iran, Israel is an extension of the United States, thereby an enemy.  American 
support to Israel transfers responsibility for actions by Israelis against Palestinians to the 
United States.  Iran routinely uses this oppression of Muslims to arouse hatred toward 
both states.  Recently President Ahmadinejad stated: 
The establishment of the Zionist regime was a move by the world 
oppressor (the United States) against the Islamic world.  The skirmishes in 
the occupied land is part of a war of destiny.  The outcome of hundreds of 
years of war will be defined in Palestinian land.  As the Imam (Ayatollah 
Khomeini) said, Israel must be wiped off the map.  The Islamic ummah 
(community) will not allow its historic enemy to live in its heartland.  
Anyone who signs a treaty which recognizes the entity of Israel means he 
has signed the surrender of the Muslim world.   Any leaders in the Islamic 
ummah who recognizes Israel face wrath of their own people.62 
This speech was predictable in its delivery on Al-Quds (Jerusalem) Day in Iran.  
It signaled a major shift within Iranian leadership.  Ahmadinejad’s predecessor, Khatami, 
had called for “dialogue among civilizations.”63   The perceived immorality of the West, 
in terms of political scandals, television, music, and other media, adds fuel to the fire.  
Indeed, the prime reason for the 1979 revolution was a refutation of all Western 
influence, led by the United States through its puppets, the Shah and Israel.64   
Apparently, Ahmadinejad in his fiery rhetoric does not speak for all Iranians.  
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economic problems for us in the world.”  Khatami was proven correct by the United 
Nations Secretary General, Kofi Annan, delaying his trip to Iran in direct response to 
Ahmadinejad’s statement.65 
Ahmadinejad’s speech, and subsequently escalating rhetoric, must be taken in 
context.  It is so out of the mainstream in Iran that in making his remarks against the 
President’s speech, Khatami’s statement is the first time in over a quarter century there 
has been a rift over a major policy within the upper echelons of Tehran.66  Similar 
fractures within Iranian society will likely emerge. 
The kind of Iranian ideological outpouring that Ahmadinejad displays is a mask 
for realpolitk.  Iran has repeatedly sacrificed its support to Muslims and exportation of 
the revolution for political gain.67  Tehran ignores Russian actions against Chechen 
Muslims, the PRC’s oppression of Uighar Muslims, and Indian acts against its Muslim 
populace.  This is in return for support, such as intervening on the United Nations 
Security Council, military sales, and help completing the Bushehr nuclear power plant.68   
Similarly, it is likely that, in the face of Israel’s alleged nuclear weapons, Iran 
would further abandon the Palestinian cause for security.  Tehran would be loathe to 
aggravate Jerusalem, potentially decreasing support to groups such as Hezbollah. 
Israel’s reaction to Ahmadinejad’s statement was predictable.  Foreign Minister 
Silvan Shalom stated: “We believe Iran is trying to buy time so it can develop a nuclear 
bomb.  Iran is a clear and present danger.”69  
Israel is aware that Tehran’s rhetoric is for the masses, having conducted similar 
campaigns.  David Ivry, the planner of the Osirak strike stated: “You cannot eliminate an 
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idea, a national will.  But you can delay progress on a nuclear program with the 
appropriate military action.  That is a valuable objective in itself.”70  Once both sides 
have nuclear weapons, rhetoric should decline to avoid mutual misperception.  There is 
only one case of Iran specifically threatening Israel with nuclear attack.71  This mutual 
vehemence would be moderated in the face of mutual deterrence.  For, if either goes too 
far, they risk undesired escalation. 
a. Conclusions from the Debate 
It is unlikely that Israel will strike Iran, given the difficulties involved.  
Even if Israel does attack successfully, it will only buy time and reinforce the need for 
nuclear weapons in Iran.  The larger question from this debate is over whether or not 
Israel needs to take action.  Both nations are led by realists who will seek national 
security over irrational actions.  The shared history and an understanding of the reasons 
Iran desires these weapons show that they understand the severity of this path and will 
probably not follow it. 
C. OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO ISRAEL 
In response to Iran’s nuclear program, Israel has four courses of action: attacking 
the production and deployment sites, using covert means to eliminate Iranian technical 
programs and specialists, as it did in Iraq, opening back-channel communications with 
Tehran, or seeking broader security cooperation with the United States.72  Predicting the 
course, Jerusalem will likely take requires an assessment of each option.   
1. Preemptive Strike 
Shortly after the 1981 attack against Osirak, then Israeli Defense Minister Ariel 
Sharon stated Israel’s intent toward emerging enemy nuclear states: 
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Our determination is to prevent confrontation states from gaining access to 
nuclear weapons.  Israel cannot afford the introduction of the nuclear 
weapon.  For us, it is not a question of a balance of terror but a question of 
survival.  We shall therefore have to prevent such a threat at its 
inception.73 
This policy, though perhaps wise at the time, is outdated by the proven point that 
states that desire nuclear weapons will acquire them, no matter what the obstacles may 
be.  Furthermore, it was made moot by the Pakistani tests in 1998, which led to the 
“Islamic” bomb.  Iran will add a “Shi’a” bomb. 
Exploring Israel’s reaction to Pakistan’s nuclearization helps one predict how it 
will view Iran’s.  Shortly before its 1998 tests, Islamabad was mindful of a possible 
Osirak-style strike at its Kahuta nuclear facility.  Israel did not strike, however, allowing 
Islamabad to go nuclear.  Pakistan’s weapons, meant to deter India, do not present as 
serious a threat as Iran’s, which are meant for Israel.  Of course, Pakistan’s instability 
could change its intent rather quickly, making it a very real threat to Israel.  The fact that 
Israel allowed such a fundamentally unstable Islamic state to go nuclear without reaction 
suggests it could do the same for another nation. 
Israel did not strike Pakistan because of U.S. intervention.74  Communicating 
between Karachi and Jerusalem, Israel learned that the Pakistanis were not testing in 
response to it.75  If Iran espouses more direct threats to Jerusalem, the effect could be 
similarly mitigated by reassurance from Washington.  What form this would take is 
unclear.  Clearly, Iran would think twice before risking devastation through 
miscommunication.  The United States is constrained in its communications by not 
having relations with Iran.  Great Britain, however could facilitate such a message.  
Again, several issues can prevent Israel from striking.  The key fact is that, even if 
Israel did manage to destroy all production and storage sites, it would only serve to 
confirm Iran’s nuclear need.  Tehran would probably rebuild its program in stronger 
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facilities, for, given the high level of public support for becoming a nuclear state, it 
cannot afford offending its people by departing from the course of nuclearization. 
2. Covert Action 
Six separate covert actions, purportedly by Israel, were executed leading up to the 
BABYLON.  These operations ranged from threatening letters to those involved in Iraq’s 
program to a ground attack on the complex itself where a number of operatives were 
caught by the Iraqis.76  These actions require an out-of-area operational capability into 
Iran that Israel would have difficulty achieving.  As with the strike option, the number 
and location of Iranian sites and lack of hard intelligence would make this option difficult 
and dangerous.  With Iraq, a number of these covert actions occurred outside Iraq, in the 
relatively easy-to-operate environment of Europe.  A growing self-sufficient Iran would 
not offer this opportunity.  Finally, there is always the possibility the operatives could be 
captured and identified, risking a vicious response by Iran against Israel. 
3. Back Channel Understanding 
Clearly, opening secret communications between two states with such enmity 
seems unlikely; however, it is in both Iran and Israel’s interests to do so as Iran goes 
nuclear.  First, the potential destruction resulting from misperception of nuclear intent 
demands some level of mutual understanding.  Second, it is unlikely that Israel could 
destroy Iran’s entire stockpile in a preemptive strike, inviting retaliation.  Third, such an 
arrangement could include an understanding about support to Hezbollah and the 
establishment of a Palestinian state, allowing both to limit volatile rhetoric toward each 
other.  Finally, removing the threat of destruction would ensure the security of both, 
removing in turn, mutual paranoia and the accompanying instability.   
This course of action is not without precedent.  Israel and Iran, during the mid-
1980’s, had a similar agreement.  Such an arrangement would require some sort of “hot 
line,” creating the greatest obstacle for Tehran, since it would constitute a tacit 
recognition of Israel as a state.77  However this would be required as a necessity for Iran’s 
increased security. 
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Having such an understanding with a nuclear state is also not without pattern for 
Israel.  Jerusalem and Karachi have had relatively open, behind-the-scenes relations since 
both states were founded.  These ties endured throughout Israel’s unease over Pakistan’s 
developing and eventually successful nuclear program.78 
The chief concern between Israel and Iran are C2 procedures.  Israel has, 
allegedly, possessed nuclear weapons for decades and probably has a clearly defined 
doctrine for the control and use of its weapons.  Iran, would probably need to play catch-
up.  Considering the historic control of WMD by the IRGC, and its disposition to act 
without orders, this will cause great consternation in Israel.79  Owing to the serious nature 
of these weapons, the deterrent value of retaliation by the Israelis will motivate Tehran to 
formulate a working policy.  Obviously, deterrence can be a difficult proposition, but in 
fact it requires only a basic understanding that launching nuclear weapons against a 
nuclearlized enemy invites a similar response.80   
4. Broader Security Guarantee 
The United States is not likely to change its commitment to the security of Israel.  
As the sole superpower and ally to Israel, America is in a position to guarantee the 
security of Israel in the face of a nuclear Iran.  This will not result in long-term stability, 
as discussed in Chapter III.  Instead it is suited to ensuring security for the non-nuclear 
Gulf Arab States.  Any sustained security between two nuclear states must be resolved by 
the two parties with only limited influence from outside.  Furthermore, with Israel’s 
historic demands to be in control of its own defense, it is uncertain how open Jerusalem 
would be to placing its security in the hands of an outsider. 
Some measure of guaranteed security is possible.  However, any American 
connection to a deterrent relationship between Iran and Israel will suffer from Israel 
having the United States in its corner.  This would destabilize the balance, possibly 
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providing Israel security where it may risk initiating an attack on Iran in the hopes of 
exploiting American security, destroying Iran before Tehran could respond. 
D. IMPLICATIONS FOR UNITED STATES’ INTERESTS 
No matter the course decided, it will impact the United States’ interests.  If both 
Israel and Iran come to a mutually deterring agreement, there will be an easing of 
tensions.  Should this happen, Iran will feel suitably secure to allow the addressing of 
domestic economic concerns.  Nationalism will still demand nuclear weapons, but 
Tehran’s intransigent policies would be eased. 
Over time, Iran may gradually reassert itself in areas of interest to the United 
States: Iraq, the Arab Gulf States, as discussed in Chapter III, and Afghanistan.  
However, having dealt with this concern, and possessing nuclear weapons for security, 
Iran would not feel bound to intervene either directly or asymmetrically.   
Eventually, the framework suggested between Israel and Iran may lead to an 
easing of economic sanctions against Iran and may allow U.S. contractors to aid in 
increasing Iran’s oil output.  This would ease concerns over the security needs of the flow 
of oil out of the Arabian Gulf, leading to a drop in the price of oil.  This in itself aids U.S. 
interests, not only through lower prices, but the increased access to oil markets.  
E. CONCLUSION  
It is difficult to ascertain with any degree of certainty what will happen in the 
future; however, based upon historical actions, statements by national leaders, and likely 
alternatives, it is possible to eliminate unlikely options.  According to this chapter, 
Israel’s response to a nuclear-armed Iran will likely be a behind-the-scenes agreement of 
mutual deterrence.  Animus shared since the 1979 Islamic Revolution is not relevant to 
the situation.  Both will realize the potential of their destruction, if one attacks the other.   
Following a careful study of the debate in Israel, military strikes, either by air or 
special operations, are mitigated through Tehran’s dispersal of production and likely 
storage facilities.  An increased security understanding with the United States, though 
useful, still places the security of Israel in the hands of an outsider. 
The understanding between Israel and Iran will add to the overall stability in the 
region by removing one aspect of uncertainty that causes instability: the violent rhetoric 
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and threats of attack between Jerusalem and Tehran.  Over time, this tie may lead to the 
removal of concerns in Israel over Hezbollah and concerns in Iran over the Palestinians.  
In the end, this may produce greater understanding between the two, instilling greater 
economic prosperity for Iran and Israel while also enhancing the economic and security 
interests of the United States.  This outcome is predicted by Nuclear Optimists who feel 
more nuclear states may be better for global security.  When Iran obtains nuclear 
weapons, it will be normal for Israel to be concerned; however, the stability that comes 
from a deterrent relationship will far outweigh secondary issues.   Instead, both states will 
























III. GULF STATES REACTION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Arabian Gulf States entering a nuclear arms race with Iran is a situation 
unacceptable to the United States.  This situation would carry the potential to plunge the 
region into brinksmanship analogous to the Cuban Missile Crisis.  Iran’s nuclearization 
threatens to undermine regional security more than Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait.  
Moreover, the rapid proliferation of nuclear weapons could potentially upset the global 
economy by interfering with the region’s oil export.  As Iran gains access to nuclear 
weapons, an assessment of the Arab Gulf States reaction is useful to help guide U.S. 
policy toward Iran.   
The Arab Gulf States: Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the 
United Arab Emirates have said little about Iranian nuclearization.  Its wait-and-see 
mentality has three causes.  First, these states traditionally have formulated foreign policy 
in private, without transparency, announcing it only when deemed absolutely necessary.  
The Gulf Coalition Council (GCC) has shifted its attitude toward a nuclear Iran, but it has 
done so in a very limited manner.  The Gulf States are likely to continue to avoid 
specifying a policy until no other course is available to them.  Second, on a diplomatic 
level, the Arab Gulf States likely do not want to irritate Iran, complicating the current 
negotiations between Iran and the rest of the world.  It would be better to have others 
solve the problem of a nuclear Iran than to become involved.  Third, as partners in oil 
production and as neighbors, the Arab Gulf States have no interest in provoking Iran, 
which may in turn disrupt the status-quo that keeps these states among the richest in the 
world.  Iran’s past attempts to overthrow regional leaders is well remembered, and those 
states would prefer not to return to those days.   
The debate on this issue takes two courses.  On one hand, a nuclear-armed Iran is 
not a serious concern.  There are already nuclear states within the region, and it is nothing 
new.  In gaining nuclear weapons, Israel and Pakistan have not caused any further 
instability.  Similarly, Iran also would not significantly impact the region.  One of Israel’s 
most prominent military historians, Martin van Creveld of the Hebrew University in 
Jerusalem, has justified Iran’s nuclear program in response to Israel’s own nuclear status.  
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Van Creveld is on record stating that, in the face of Israel’s increasing nuclear 
capabilities, through alleged deployment of nuclear equipped submarines to the region, 
Iran would be “crazy” not to try to develop a similar capability.81  The other side of the 
debate depicts a nuclear Iran as a serious threat to regional security.  Iran with nuclear 
weapons would potentially reenergize its aims to export its Islamic revolution and 
supplant regional regimes with those more in line with Tehran’s vision of fundamentalist 
law. With nuclear weapons, Iran threatens to shift the balance of power within the 
Arabian Gulf in its favor, against the smaller and weaker Arab Gulf States.82   
This chapter examines the reaction that the Arab Gulf States will likely have to a 
nuclear-armed Iran.  This chapter scrutinizes the background of regional historical 
concerns about Iran.  Second, the chapter describes the current Gulf States security 
apprehensions about Iran.  Third, the chapter assesses the impact that a nuclear-armed 
Iran is likely to have regionally, including response options available to them.  Finally, it 
outlines the likely impact these matters will have on U.S. interests. 
B. BACKGROUND 
The introduction of nuclear weapons to the region is not a new prospect.  
According to Professor Avner Cohen of the Center for International and Security Studies 
at the University of Maryland, Israel has, reportedly, possessed these weapons for 
decades–furthermore, Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in 1998.83  According to Judith 
Yaphe and Colonel Charles Lutes of the National Defense University, adding another 
state to the list seems, on the surface, not to be an immediate concern to the GCC.84 
However, the region has serious concerns over Iran’s revolutionary past.  All of 
the Gulf Arab States were impacted by Tehran’s revolutionary zeal.  Shortly after the 
1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran began supporting terrorist groups that sought to overthrow 
Arab Gulf State governments and to replace with regimes ruled by Islamic fundamentalist 
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law.85  In recent years, Tehran has worked to improve its public image, allaying its 
neighbors’ fears of its earlier subversive activity. However, there is still much to concern 
the weaker Arab Gulf States.  In light of President Ahmadinejad’s speeches calling for 
the destruction of Israel and his insistence of Iran’s nuclear rights, Tehran seems to have 
cast aside its desire to rejoin the mainstream international community.86 
Tehran is aware of the potential alarm nuclearization brings, as stated by its 
Defense Minister, Admiral Ali Shamkani: “The existence of nuclear weapons will turn us 
into a threat that could be exploited in dangerous ways to harm our relations with the 
countries of the region."87  This quotation shows that Tehran appreciates the potential for 
regional disturbance that nuclear weapons have.  Appreciation, however, does not appear 
to cause Tehran hesitancy.  Rather it seems to have increased determination to press 
ahead and diplomatically manage the political consequences as nuclear states have done 
before. 
Iran’s history shows it is willing to pursue whatever course its national security 
demands.  The lead Iranian negotiator to the IAEA, Muhammad Larijani, has stated: “If 
our national interests dictate, we can go to the bowels of hell to negotiate with the 
devil.”88  Apparently then, there is no limit to how far Iran will go in pursuit of military 
and political supremacy over the Arabian Gulf region.  It is this pursuit of greatness that 
has historically driven Iran to upset the balance in the region.  Iran with nuclear weapons 
could continue this trend. 
Regional states in this uncertain environment look for other sources of security.  
Domestic nuclear programs launched by these states to balance Iran’s program are of 
chief concern to the United States.  In pursuit of security, the region has circumvented its 
protector, the United States, in the past.  The United States will need to expand its 
traditional role as provider of security to the regional militarily weak states particularly in 
the uncertain times that will surround the emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran. 
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If the Gulf States were to embark on independent nuclear programs three 
dangerous side effects could emerge.  First, Israel would become nervous at the rapidly 
increasing number of Arab nuclear states.  Second, a rapid increase in nuclear-armed 
states may cause a regional arms race.  Finally, with a number of programs being 
launched, security of the production facilities could possibly be weak, as the states may 
opt for speed of production over security and a well coordinated C2.  This rash mindset 
could induce terrorists to seize fissile material or actual weapons.  Such rapid 
proliferation of nuclear weapons could ignite the proverbial fall of nuclear dominoes, 
with states ill-prepared for the responsibilities of nuclear statehood.  Therefore, the 
United States must deter Iranian threats, remain engaged with the region, and prevent any 
nations from launching crash programs.  As Nuclear Optimists have stressed, stability 
from nuclear proliferation comes from the slow addition of nuclear states, not haphazard 
races for production. 
None of the Arab Gulf States have a nuclear-weapons program.  In fact, the 
opposite is true: these states historically have pressed for a nuclear-free Middle East.  
Fundamentally, they have attempted to urge Israel to disarm, but also hoped to limit 
Iran’s program.  Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah exemplifies this: “The Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia, like other countries in the region, rejects the acquisition of nuclear weapons by 
anyone, especially nuclear weapons in the Middle East region.  We hope that such 
weapons will be banned or eliminated from the region by every country in the region.”89  
Echoing him, the Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research (ECSSR) based in 
the U.A.E. cites a nuclear-free region, coupled with the NPT as key to regional stability.90  
There is no serious concern of rapid proliferation in the region, even if these states 
decided today to launch a program, it would take years to produce results.   
This status of nuclear-weapon programs in the region is a key component to 
further proliferation.  Compared to Iran, the Arab Gulf States, have not yet initiated a 
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nuclear program.  It is at this point, during a program’s early stages when it is relatively 
easy to halt, either through diplomatic or military means.  Since none of the Arab Gulf 
States have invested the resources to start a program, it is easier to prevent them from 
launching such programs through assurances of protection.  Even if one of these states 
attempted to purchase weapons, it would face significant hurdles due to the consequences 
to the seller, if the sale were traced back to that state.  Furthermore, that any state would 
be able to acquire enough weapons to deter Iran is improbable, and doing so would 
require revelation of that states’ nuclear capability, raising serious questions from the 
IAEA.   
The Arabian Gulf is a critical area of the world for U.S. security interests.  In 
2003, the region produced about 27 percent of the world’s oil.  The Arabian Gulf is home 
to over 57 percent of the world’s oil reserves and accounts for 45 percent of the world’s 
oil production capacity.91  If the United States were to cease its involvement, some other 
state would step in, with potentially disastrous global results.  No other country possesses 
the capability or the respect as a global power to fulfill the Arab Gulf States security 
needs.  Even if a state did step forward to offer protection, the Arab Gulf States’ would 
still feel required to balance Iranian threats.  How the Arab Gulf States would react to 
Tehran’s nuclear weapons is of vital concern to the United States.  Any disruption at all 
to the flow of oil out of the region has immediate and serious economic implications for 
the industrialized world.   
In response to a nuclear Iran, states in the region have three options: do nothing, 
join a nuclear umbrella, or acquire their own weapons.  This chapter demonstrates that 
the likely course of action for these nations will be to expand security guarantees with the 
United States by joining a nuclear umbrella to offset Iran’s nuclear weapons. 
C. GULF STATES SECURITY CONCERNS 
Historically, the Arab Gulf States have been weak in comparison to the militarily 
powerful Iran.  Iran was spared colonization, but instead it was influenced by both Russia 
and Great Britain, each vying for control behind the scenes in Iran, and through this 
manipulation, helped shape Iran into a modern state.  Starting in 1926 under Reza Shah 
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Pahlavi, this took the form of modernization of Iran’s army (a first in the Arabian Gulf 
region).92  Iran’s power has waxed and waned, reaching its peak with the last Shah, Reza 
Muhammad Pahlavi, who under the Twin Pillars policy, was able to buy any U.S. system, 
except for nuclear weapons.93  Iran’s physical features add to the stature of the country.  
The geographic size of Iran and its large population (nearly equal to the rest of the Gulf 
States combined), coupled with its oil reserves, virtually ensure that Iran will always be a 
key power in the region.94  From this position of power, Iran naturally generates concerns 
to its much smaller neighbors.  These issues center on Iran’s regional hegemony, the 
GCC and its activities, and finally, the regional wild card that Iraq represents. 
1. Iran’s Hegemonistic Past  
Striking fear into the heart of its Gulf neighbors is possibly Tehran’s greatest skill.  
Centuries of regional struggle and interference by Iran have cemented this in the minds of 
regional leaders.  Iranian civilization hearkens back over 2,500 years to Cyrus the Great 
in 550 B.C., annotated by evicting Arab invaders in 1506 A.D. and making the state 
home to the Shi’a sect of Islam.95  To outsiders, these events of the distant past may seem 
trivial, but they are concerns of Arab Gulf State leaders.  The U.S. removal of Iraq as a 
regional power is the most recent cause for regional concern.  By removing Saddam 
Hussein and destroying Iraq’s military, no state is remotely equal to Iran in the region.  
Recent events continue to show the Arabian Gulf region remains a dangerous 
neighborhood.  Enhancing this historical concern: the region has hosted three major 
conflicts in the past 25 years.  These theater wars have seen the full scale use of chemical 
weapons, ballistic missiles, and asymmetric terrorist attacks. Though not alone in the use 
of these, Iran seems the most willing to employ them again.  
Every Arab Gulf State has had to contend with Iranian-sponsored terrorist groups.  
These groups undermine the Sunni leadership of monarchical states and attempt to 
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replace the royal families with Shi’a Muslim fundamentalist governments.  Highlights of 
these efforts include: attempting to overthrow the government of Bahrain, embarrassing 
and delegitimizing the government of Kuwait, and embarrassing the House of Saud in 
Saudi Arabia.  A nuclear Iran could reassert itself by reinvigorating these efforts. 
The GCC has attempted to improve its military capabilities in the face of a 
powerful Iran.  The Arab Gulf States have made massive purchases of military hardware.  
However, this is generally superficial in nature.  The states, with almost limitless funds, 
can purchase the latest systems on the market, but high-tech novelties are virtually 
useless without massive support from outside states to maintain them and to train the 
military forces of the region.  The only course of action open to the GCC and Iraq is to 
outsource state security needs.  The United States has served as protector of these states 
since the 1971 British withdrawal from the region.96  Without this protection, the Arab 
Gulf States could face the threat of conquest at the hands of ancient Persian enemies.     
A much greater potential for conflict exists between Iran and regional non-nuclear 
neighbors than between Iran and Israel or Pakistan.  This animosity is based on historical 
patterns of Persian influence in the Gulf, large Shi’a populations in Gulf Arab States, and 
the existence of other sources of turmoil and political disputes between these states and 
Iran.  Indeed, Tehran has become a status-quo power, yet there is nothing that suggests it 
does not covet its neighbors’ wealth, nor that it would not exploit nuclear weapons to 
secure regional dominance. 
Under the Pahlavi Dynasty, Iranian regional hegemony was only a moderate 
concern to the United States and the region.  During this time, as part of the Twin Pillars 
doctrine, Iranian desire for dominion was sated through the de facto recognition of its 
dominance by the United States as the power in the region.97  With the fall of the Shah to 
Muslim fundamentalists and the subsequent ending of American support, Iranian 
expansionism and nationalism significantly increased. 
Former commander of the IRGC, Mohsen Rezai, illustrates Iran’s image of 
asserting itself regionally: “The building of the Shahab-3 missile is not in breach of the 
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peaceful policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which looks at détente and the 
establishment of peace and security in the region of the Persian Gulf against those who 
commit aggression against the rights of nations.”98  This quotation shows Iran’s view of 
being able to speak for the entire region as its benevolent protector.  The point of view 
espoused fails to recognize that the majority of the region does not identify closely with 
Tehran’s leadership or its ideals. 
2. Saudi Arabia 
Understanding Saudi Arabia’s unique role in the Arabian Gulf helps to frame 
issues that the Arab Gulf States have with Iran.  Even though not direct engaged in public 
disagreement, Iran and Saudi Arabia eye each other warily over a host of issues.  First, 
Saudi Arabia’s key role as the leader of the Sunni sect of Islam regularly puts it at odds 
with the Shi’a in Iran.  Second, the fact that Iranians are Persian, not Arabs, increases 
friction between the two states.  Third, Saudi Arabia has regularly manipulated oil prices 
to benefit its powerful benefactor, the United States.  Finally, Saudi Arabia, while 
appearing outwardly to be unconcerned with Iranian nuclear weapons, possesses the very 
real ability to develop its own nuclear weapons.  Indeed, Riyadh has shown a propensity 
to act independently of America.  Taken as a whole, these issues reveal that the region is 
very resistant to Iran’s self-perceived role as arbiter of the region. 
a Religion 
One of the King of Saudi Arabia’s many titles is “custodian of the two 
holy mosques” referring to Islam’s two holiest sites, Mecca and Medina, location inside 
the kingdom. 99  Traditionally, he has enjoyed a central role as a key political leader to the 
world’s 1 billion plus Muslims.100  That is to say, the Sunni branch of Islam, accounting 
for the vast majority of all Muslims. 
Iran regularly contests Saudi Arabia’s claim to speak for all Muslims.  Iran 
is currently the only Islamic country ruled by the Shi’a branch of Islam.  Both sects view 
the other with varying levels of disdain.  In some Islamic schools of thought, the other is 
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not even viewed as being truly Muslim.  This rift is based upon what each side holds to 
be important to Islam.  To Sunnis, it is upholding the five pillars of Islam; to Shi’a, it is 
focusing on the actions of the martyrs and centers upon self sacrifice.101 
In modern times, this animus has grown since the 1979 revolution in Iran.  
A number of incidents in which Iran has incited the Shi’as in Saudi Arabia to overthrow 
the monarchy have occurred.  Most egregious were regular attempts by Iranian pilgrims 
to demonstrate against the House of Saud during the annual Hajj (pilgrimage) to Mecca 
and Medina, occasionally becoming violent.  The worst took place in July of 1987 when 
a group of Iranians rioted, leading to hundreds of deaths and injuries.  When news of the 
riot reached Iran, it organized mobs to attack the embassies of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait 
in Tehran where one diplomat was killed.102  The Saudi government blamed Iran, 
accusing it of attempting to overthrow the regime.  Riyadh will remember these acts for a 
long time to come, remaining in appearance friendly to Tehran as fellow Muslims, but 
remaining very wary of their actions. 
There is, on the surface at least, some appearance of brotherhood between 
the two.  Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah has stated: “Iran is a friendly country. Iran is a 
Muslim country. We hope that Iran will not become an obstacle to peace and security in 
Iraq. This is what we hope for and this is what we believe the Iraqi people want.”103  
Based on this quote, while there are similarities that unite both sides, the Sunnis in power 
in Saudi Arabia are wary of losing ground to the Shi’a minority, possibly in Iraq. 
This concern held by Saudi Arabia has moderated somewhat in recent 
times.  Since Khomeini’s death, Iran has restrained actions against Saudi Arabia.  No 
longer does it actively incite branches of Islamic Jihad to overthrow the leaders of Arab 
Gulf States.  These activities were one of the most important state policies in the 
Khomeini years.  However, as mentioned in the previous chapter, religious fervor 
motivating irrational action has become a mask for realpolitik in Iran.  With the election 
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of Mahmud Ahmadinejad as President, Iran still must work cautiously in the region to 
help deal with its domestic economic issues.  Returning to the days of Khomeini, when it 
appeared Iran stood against the rest of the world, is not the answer, and Tehran knows it. 
b. Persian Versus Arab 
Iranians are not Arabs, like all of their regional Muslim brethren, instead 
they are Persian. This is significant in how Iranians are viewed within the Arabian Gulf 
region.  Furthermore, Farsi is the spoken language of Iran, not Arabic.  At first glance this 
seems inconsequential; however, Arabic is the language of the Koran.  It is the tongue in 
which Muslims believe it must be read to receive the full meaning of its message.  The 
split between Persian and Arab, combined with the former seeking to dominate the Gulf, 
only adds to Iran’s alienation.  In spite of Tehran’s claims to speak for the Muslim world, 
it is viewed as an outsider.  This is unlikely to ever change.  
3. It is the Oil, Stupid 
Religion may be central to Arabian Gulf identity and motives, but it is the oil that 
seizes the world’s attention.  How it has been managed historically has raised serious 
concerns globally.  Since creating a partnership with the United States in 1944, Saudi 
Arabia has regularly manipulated its oil production to keep the price low.104   
This price is a critical regional issue.  With its serious economic problems, Iran 
desperately needs additional income to fulfill reforms promised by President 
Ahmadinejad.105  Any reduction in prices is cause for concern in Tehran.  The 1990 
invasion of Kuwait came from a similar financial situation in Iraq.  Iranian oil production 
today is two-thirds of what it was prior to the 1979 Revolution, only adding stress to the 
situation.106  Due in large part to Iran’s inability to access modern oil recovery 
technology, to maintain its fields efficiently, and its desire for independence, Tehran 
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needs all the income it can secure.107  A telling example of its economic woes is Iran’s 
unemployment numbers.  Professor Robert Looney of the Naval Postgraduate School 
states: 
No mark of economic failure stands out as much as the country’s (Iran) 
chronic unemployment.  Between 1996 and 2000, 693,000 workers 
entered the labor market, while only 296,000 jobs were being created.  
Unemployment is somewhere between 15 and 25 percent, with a 
disproportionate share among urban youth.  According to the World Bank, 
the creation of between 700,000 to 800,000 new jobs each year is needed 
to stabilize unemployment at an acceptable level.  This would require a 
growth rate of roughly 6 percent.  And the post-2000 oil boom has not 
come close to this growth rate.108 
Clearly President Ahmadinejad faces an arduous task.  The recent upsurge in oil 
prices has helped Iran somewhat, but not enough to overcome Iran’s economic problems.  
Tensions over Iran creating nuclear weapons cause the price to spike, carrying a double-
edged sword.  Any regional nuclear threat by Iran could invite a serious response by 
outside states that are dependent upon Gulf oil, the PRC for example.  These states could 
act unilaterally to secure oil production.  Therefore, Iran must speak softly while carrying 
a big stick, to paraphrase President Theodore Roosevelt.109 
4. Lack of Concern 
Lead by Saudi Arabia, the Arab Gulf States seem unconcerned about a nuclear 
Iran.  For a long time, these states have not viewed a nuclear-armed Iran as a greater 
threat than a non-nuclear-armed one.  Further, the Arab Gulf States reject the premise that 
a nuclear Iran is a threat while a similarly armed Israel is not. 110  Instead, these states 
appear more concerned that America will drag them into a war with Iran over this, or 
some other issue.111  Furthermore, the GCC criticizes the lack of contact between Tehran 
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and Washington, which it believes to be the source of any potential conflict.112  The Arab 
Gulf States will follow Saudi Arabia’s lead and continue to do little on this issue. 
5. Doubts of American Assurances/Pursuit of Self Defense 
Saudi Arabia and America continue to have shared goals for regional security, in 
spite of 9/11 and its aftermath.  Although both states made a solemn deal after World 
War II, neither side has always been a team player.   
America, with its Christian roots and support of Israel, brings domestic problems 
to the House of Saud.  The resultant hesitancy in conceding to the United States’ desires 
has concerned the U.S. at times.  When Iraq invaded Kuwait, the Saudis vacillated on 
allowing American troops into the kingdom, only after a direct briefing by then Secretary 
of Defense Richard Cheney to Saudi leadership was protection requested.  Similarly, 
during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, Saudi Arabia declined hosting U.S. ground forces.  
American support to Saudi Arabian military sales requests has been similarly 
hesitant.  In light of Israeli interest groups making American arms transfers to Arab states 
difficult, the Arab Gulf States have occasionally looked to other suppliers.  Frustrated by 
the prolonged fight between President Reagan and Congress to purchase Airborne 
Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) aircraft, the Saudi’s sought to teach the United 
States a lesson.113  Despite the eventual approval of the AWACS deal, the Saudis sought 
alternatives for its arms.114 
The ultimate result of the AWACS deal was the PRC working its way into the 
Saudi’s good graces.  In the late 1980s, Saudi Arabia secretly purchased at least 50 CSS-
2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM) in a secret deal with the PRC.115  This was 
in response both to the United States’ denial of purchase of Lance missiles and frustration 
over previous delays in acquiring weapons.116  Saudi Arabia’s King Fahd stated to the 
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military that: “The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is not tied to anyone and does not take part 
in any pact that forces upon it any sort of obligations.  If things become complicated with 
a certain country, we will find other countries, regardless of whether they are Eastern or 
Western.  We are buying weapons, not principles.”117  Based on this quote and 
subsequent Saudi actions, Riyadh has shown it is no longer willing to wait while 
Washington decides to support the kingdom.  The missile sale set the stage for future 
military purchases outside the control of the United States.  Unlike America, the PRC 
suffers no compunction from supplying Saudi Arabia with whatever it desires.  Riyadh is 
now Beijing’s primary source of oil and, according to Professor James Russell of the 
Naval Postgraduate School, over the next 20 years this relationship will only become 
more pronounced.118   
6. The GCC at Large  
Taking to heart the Arab proverb: “in the desert of life, the wise person travels by 
caravan, whereas the fool prefers to travel alone,” the GCC was formed in the face of 
Iranian and Iraqi threats.119  In light of the dangerous neighborhood in which they are 
located, the smaller, less populated Gulf States were sensible to band together, shortly 
after the 1981 start of the Iran/Iraq War.  The objective of the GCC was originally to 
foster unity among Arabs in the Gulf region based upon their shared identity. 120  Security 
soon became the chief concern.  The most pressing need was protection from the violence 
of the Iran/Iraq War and Iranian export of Islamic Revolution.  These fears lead to the 
creation of mutual defense plans and a number of military organizations.121   
Despite their advanced weapons systems, the GCC countries’ military forces lack 
large populations to support powerful armed forces to counter those of Iran.  As a result, 
the GCC has historically relied upon outsiders for protection.  Operations DESERT 
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SHIELD/STORM exemplifies this dependence.  Fortunately for the region, the United 
States formed a coalition to remove Iraq from Kuwait.  Without this intervention, Kuwait 
would not have likely been liberated.  The resulting paradigm from Operation DESERT 
STORM was an ideal situation for the Gulf States: The United States kept Iraq under 
control; however, Iraq remained strong enough to hold off Iran.  These actions by the 
United States kept both of the powerful states in the region at bay while the smaller states 
were able to exist in relative safety. 
Following Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the United States seeks to stabilize Iraq.  
The end of the previous decade of relative regional security raises the questions about 
how the security of the GCC will be maintained now that the previous balance has been 
disrupted.  Over the near- to mid-term, the need for access to oil will become vital.  
American involvement with the GCC is likely to increase as a result of this need.  
Similarly, GCC reliance upon U.S. security will also grow.  These states will remain 
unable to defend themselves against Iran or Iraq. 
The GCC countries have made limited statements individually about a nuclear 
Iran.  The Secretary-General of the GCC, Abdel Rahman Attiya was quoted in the Saudi 
daily al-Watan saying, “Saudi Arabia and the other GCC countries can’t find any 
justification for such nuclear activity, which poses great dangers for all the peoples in the 
Gulf Region.  We are actually seeking to make the region free of weapons of mass 
destruction.”  He went on to state, “In view of the existing imbalance of powers in the 
region, certain GCC countries have worked out security arrangements with outside 
parties to restore a certain balance with neighbors who appear to have regional 
ambitions.”122  This statement of GCC reliance on outsiders for security shows its desire 
to continue outsourcing security.  These states seem very satisfied with being protected 
by the sole remaining superpower. 
7. Iraq  
Following Operation IRAQI FREEDOM’s regime change, Iraq became the 
regional wild card.  No longer is there an air of predictability of Saddam Hussein holding 
off Iran with Gulf Arab States support.  Rather, there is confusion and uncertainty with 
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what shape Iraq will take.  Although well founded, concern that Iran will control the 
emerging regime in Iraq is not as likely as popular opinion makes it out to be. 
Iraq will likely be the first Arab state under Shi’a rule, assuming elections 
continue.  It is a mistake, however, to presume that a Shi’a controlled Iraq will fall solely 
under the control of Iran.  Traditionally the bulwark against the extremism of Iran, Iraq is 
no friend to Iran.  The deep scars from the Iran/Iraq War remain.  Indeed, the Iraqi 
generals who led the war against Iran were, in the majority, Shi’a.123  Even today, the 
highest recognized Shi’a scholar in Iraq, Grand Ayatollah Sistani, has resisted overtures 
of friendship from Iran, despite being born and educated there.124  It is unrealistic to 
presume a Shi’a Iraq would immediately become allied with Iran.   
The removal of Saddam Hussein did little to mitigate the threat Iraq poses to the 
region.  Iraq, still under United Nations Security Council resolutions forbidding WMDs, 
will likely never be able to develop them, but it will need to defend itself against Iran.  To 
do this without WMD will require some kind of security guarantee or the development of 
a significant conventional military capability.  An unfortunate consequence of this 
buildup is that any Iraq powerful enough to fend off Iran can threaten Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia.125 
The outlook appears somewhat promising for Iraq.  Arab Gulf States are 
beginning to support the stabilization of the country.  Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Minister 
has stated he is much less concerned about the possibility for civil war and has offered 
significant funds.126  This funding suggests that Iraq’s neighbors want to return to 
supporting Iraq to hold off Iran. 
Future fence mending with the Arab world suggests that Iraq will emerge strong, 
no friend of Iran, and a supporter of Gulf security.  Indeed Iraq must improve its income 
to support rebuilding efforts and a transition to whatever form of democracy the people 
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pursue.  To do this, Iraq would do well to remain outside the circle of Iran, which likely 
only seeks to keep Baghdad weak and in chaos. 
D. IMPACT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
In a realist sense, Iran is creating a nuclear-weapons program to directly balance 
Israel’s alleged capability.  However, these weapons also appear to be meant to influence 
Iran’s neighbors, by using the unspoken power they possess to intimidate.  Iran’s desires 
would be met potentially by employing nuclear weapons to devastate non-nuclear states.  
Iran, having developed its nuclear infrastructure over decades, has had the opportunity to 
consider the benefits of this kind of nuclear employment. 
How will Iran’s nuclear weapons impact the Arabian Gulf?  This question raises 
serious questions over the direction of regional relationships in the future and the U.S. 
role.  For the GCC, the greatest concern is that a nuclear Iran may become energized and 
may revisit its desire to export the revolution throughout the region.  This course could 
cause serious problems for both the GCC and the United States.  An assertive Iran with 
nuclear weapons could require the closure of American bases in the region, renew its 
efforts to export revolution, be more assertive on oil policy, and be meddlesome in Iraqi 
or Israeli/Palestinian affairs.127  All of these possibilities pose serious threats to the Arab 
Gulf States, requiring hard choices. 
1. Middle East “Kargils”  
What would Iran actually do with its new arsenal?  Nuclear weapons provide an 
unspoken power to their possessors over those that do not.  Nuclear states have sought to 
use this power to attempt to gain concessions by nearing but not crossing the threshold of 
use.  A clear example of a state operating beneath the nuclear threshold is the Kargil 
crisis of 1999.  Along the line of control dividing Kashmir, between India and Pakistan, 
troops are evacuated from elevated locations during the winter.  In 1999, Pakistan sought 
to gain territory by using the threat of nuclear weapons to prevent Indian dispute over the 
land seized.  Over the course of the crisis, threats escalated with India and the land seized 
by Pakistan was returned.128 
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The result of this crisis would have been different if the land seized belonged to a 
non-nuclear state.  Had India not possessed nuclear weapons, Pakistan’s aggression 
would have been rewarded with the land seized.  The Kargil example shows what Iran 
could possibly do below the threshold of using its nuclear weapons: seize territory from 
neighbors and defend it with nuclear threats.  The seizing of a larger piece of the natural 
gas fields in the Arabian Gulf serves as an example.  The seizure of such an area is hardly 
worth risking nuclear war.  Hence, Iran would escape without censure.  Another case of 
Iran’s potential to push the boundaries of a deterrence framework concerns a group of 
islands that Iran seized from the U.A.E. in 1992.  This action violated a prior agreement 
assuring shared control between Iran and the U.A.E..  At the time, the action inflamed 
Arab opinion and undermined Iranian efforts to improve Gulf relations.129  With a nuclear 
threat, this dispute would be short-lived, likely dying in committee at the United Nations.  
This remains a viable possibility for a nuclear-armed Iran, yet it is unlikely that the 
regional states would simply stand by and let it happen.  Contrarily, they would reach out 
for help from those who could support them.  These supporting states, wanting no single 
actor to seize a large share of global oil reserves, would act accordingly. 
2. Options Available to the Gulf States  
In the face of a nuclear-armed Iran, the Gulf States and Iraq can choose from three 
clearly defined options.  First, they can do nothing, hoping–behind the scenes–the 
situation will resolve itself.  Second, they can establish, as a group or individually, a 
nuclear-security umbrella in a NATO-like deterrence scheme against Iran.  Finally, they 
can acquire their own weapons through domestic programs or purchasing them from 
abroad.  Of the three, the most likely course would be to maintain the status-quo: 
continuing to outsource their security. 
a. Wait and See 
The first option, doing nothing, can be compared to Saudi reluctance to 
seek outside help following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.  United States troops were invited 
only through the motivation by then U.S. Secretary of Defense Cheney, who presented 
intelligence on the possible intentions of Iraq to invade.130   
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This tactic of doing nothing failed the Kingdom in 1990.  However, with 
the likelihood that Iran’s nuclear weapons will not be used, the Arab Gulf States could be 
hopeful of success.  The GCC could decide that Iran would not risk the harsh reaction by 
the international community in the event it attacked.  This is particularly true when the 
fallout of an attack could affect Iran itself.131  Also, the Arab Gulf States could rest on the 
unspoken deterrence relationship that essentially exists today between the United States 
and Iran.  For sure, this course offers uncertainty that could produce horrific results from 
a misunderstanding based on specifics left unsaid. 
In the meantime, the Arab Gulf States would likely pursue a détente and 
engagement relationship with Tehran.  This course of action would appear as 
appeasement.  The net effect would only motivate Tehran to see how far it could push for 
concessions.  Indeed, Iran has offered an alternative: support for a regional assembly and 
a nuclear-free zone in the Arabian Gulf, in return for the region ridding itself of ties to 
external powers.132  The refuting of these outside ties would put the GCC right where 
Tehran wants it, for those ties are the only defense that stands between Iran and regional 
dominance. 
b. Join Nuclear Umbrella 
The second option, accepting some form of nuclear deterrent from outside 
states, is simply an extension of prior regional security practices.  These states will likely 
never have a capable military force, particularly in the face of Iranian nuclear weapons.  
Whatever military power the Arab Gulf States have is the result of outside powers. 
There has been talk within NATO of a Middle Eastern/NATO security 
relationship.  Patterned upon the successful doctrine that worked in Europe throughout 
the Cold War, such an agreement would need to be modified to meet regional needs.  A 
formal defense pledge would secure the Arab Gulf States protection from Iran.133  The 
Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), launched in June of 2004, began a relationship 
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between NATO and all the GCC states, save Oman.134  Currently, the ICI is stalled.  The 
threat to the Arab Gulf States has not materialized to motivate full implementation.  This 
is not an immediate concern, and the mere existence of the ICI provides the basis for 
future security understandings as needs arises.  ICI has the benefit of being a relationship 
beyond a simple unilateral agreement with the United States.  Rather it is a multilateral 
one with a host of European nations.  This puts all of NATO in the Arab Gulf States’ 
corner. 
The GCC does not actually desire this relationship fearing it as an act of 
colonialism.  Joining one would delegitimize these regimes in the eyes of their 
populace.135  Iran would exploit such an act.  These reservations could rapidly change in 
the face of an aggressive, nuclear-armed Iran.  Like Saudi hesitation in 1990, the Arab 
Gulf States could shift rapidly and allow a relationship to solidify. 
c. Domestic Nuclear Programs  
The third course of action available, namely the Gulf States developing 
their own nuclear programs, is a real, if distant, possibility.  Most of the GCC states 
possess sufficient funds to launch nuclear weapons programs.  History has also shown 
that states possessing the will can eventually obtain them.  Such a rapid addition of 
nuclear states is an invitation for crisis.   
The Saudis have, again, taken the lead in this endeavor.  In spite of 
Riyadh’s drive for a nuclear-free region, allegations have been made that Saudi Arabia 
provided Pakistan funding to support Islamabad’s nuclear program.136  Further, the two 
states may have concluded a secret agreement on nuclear cooperation.137  According to 
the report, the nations agreed to exchange oil for nuclear knowledge.138  This is a difficult 
road for Saudi Arabia to follow in the face of international restrictions, such as the NPT,  
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but it has amply proven its intent to pursue its own goals as deemed needed.  Riyadh’s 
then Minister of Defense and Aviation, Sultan bin Abdul Aziz, now Crown Prince, put it 
this way: 
We are a nation working for peace but we reserve the right to defend our 
country.  We work towards procuring the weapons necessary to protect 
our country and this makes up these weapons though live tests before we 
buy them, and we make a shield to protect the safety of the Holy Shrines 
and the security of our citizens.139 
There is, however, no evidence that Pakistan has concluded a deal to 
provide Saudi Arabia with nuclear information or weapons.  These allegations have been 
refuted by Pakistani individuals in a position to know the particulars.140  Furthermore, as 
discussed in Chapter IV, Pakistan is unable to provide the kind of support that a new 
program would require.  This is due both to international issues and commitments of 
resources to oppose Indian military superiority.  Pakistan would likely be hesitant to 
upset a neighboring nuclear-Iran for a cause not supporting its own interests.  
The further proliferation of nuclear weapons could set the stage for a 
large, multi-polar, regional nuclear deterrence network.  It is difficult to speculate how 
Tehran, with its nuclear weapons, would react while a neighbor develops its own 
program targeted solely at Iran.  It is clear how Israel would react to a series of crash 
fledgling programs.  Owing to the relative vulnerability of programs at the initial stage, 
Jerusalem would likely seize the opportunity to limit the number of Arab nuclear states.  
Presently, it is too late for Israel to slow Tehran’s program.  This may not be so for others 
just starting nuclear research. 
3. Likely Course of Action  
In light of these variables, seeing the path that the GCC and Iraq will pursue is not 
difficult.  While the Gulf Arab States may defer decisions depending on events, it will, in 
the end, seek increased security from the regions traditional guarantor: the United States.  
There really is no other workable alternative.  All are signatories of the NPT (Iraq will 
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likely rejoin the treaty prior to U.S. withdrawal).  As such, each of the states cannot easily 
pursue its own programs without consequences.  Even if a state did launch a nuclear-
weapons program, the absence of existing nuclear program would allow the international 
community plenty of opportunity to prevent that nation from advancing its efforts.  This 
intervention could take the form of economic sanctions or military action. 
Contrary to public opinion, America retains its credibility in the region.  The 
United States has invaded and removed two regimes hostile to Iran.  The speed and 
relative ease with which these were carried out is not lost on Tehran.  Particularly in the 
case of Iraq where the United States, nearly on its own, defeated Saddam Hussein within 
months, a defeat Iran could not achieve in eight years.  Any security commitment made 
by America, would be taken very seriously by Tehran.  This is particularly true in light of 
President Bush’s 2002 State of the Union address in which he declared Iran was a 
member of the Axis of Evil.141  In spite of a collective hesitancy to support the United 
States, none of the Arab Gulf States can refute its capabilities. 
Tehran realizes that using nuclear weapons against the United States or Israel 
would be suicide.  This action along with a return to regional assertiveness is counter to 
Iran’s recent historical character.  It has been over 150 years since Iran invaded or 
attacked another country.142  Instead it stood by, satisfied to watch from the sidelines.  As 
a result, Tehran will be even more likely to act reasonably in the face of a nuclear 
deterrent.  While publicly it will deride the declaration as an affront to regional peace and 
stability, internally, Tehran will be shaken by the thought of a nuclear attack and self-
deterred from acting impulsively. 
The Arab Gulf States have shown tacit acceptance of outsourcing security.  The 
Emirates Center on Security Studies and Research has presented a study investigating 
Iran’s progress and supports the United States’ stance toward preventing a nuclear 
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Iran.143  It focuses upon the United States as the natural leader against Iran’s regional 
aspirations.  Based on this assessment, one can deduce that when Iran gains these 
weapons, the Arab Gulf States would be amenable to America expanding its protection of 
the region to include nuclear deterrence.   
E. IMPACT ON UNITED STATES INTERESTS 
How will a nuclear-armed Iran impact United States interests in the Arabian Gulf 
Region?  With the single exception of Homeland Security, the continued flow of oil out 
of the region is the greatest priority.  A myriad of issues are involved in the region; yet, 
the introduction of nuclear weapons to Iran, grave as it may be, with the proper 
understanding should not threaten the regional balance. 
American commitment to deterring Iran has been reemphasized regularly.  In 
1986, when then Vice President George H.W. Bush stated that in the event of an Iranian 
attack against our interests “We will not wait for an invitation to intervene.”144  Nor will 
America be alone.  The United Kingdom has made it clear that the closure of the Strait of 
Hormuz and an attack on Kuwait will be cause for intervention.  With the defeat handed 
Iran by the United States Navy during Operation PRAYING MANTIS and the downing 
of a civilian Airbus by an American Navy cruiser, Tehran takes these threats seriously 
and is wary of conflict with the United States.145 
Since the end of the Iran/Iraq War, Tehran has sat back and watched all of the 
conflicts, contrary to its public bravado about militarily engaging the United States.  
During Operation PRAYING MANTIS, it all but stood by frozen while the United States 
Navy destroyed a number of oil platforms and an Iranian Naval gunboat with little real 
resistance.  During Operation DESERT STORM, Iran declared its neutrality, doing 
nothing but to accept Iraqi aircraft into its airspace.  Similarly, in Operations DESERT 
FOX, ENDURING and IRAQI FREEDOM, Iran stood by, waiting for the outcome.   
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This is not to say that there are not red lines that would force a nuclear Iran to 
react.  The Rand Corporation suggests five reasons that would motivate Iran to act: 
1.   A threat to the religious rule of the mullahs 
2.   Open disrespect to Khomeini or for his legacy  
3.  Social reforms that threaten the existing view or equilibrium of society 
4.   Jeopardizing the unity or sanctity of the states 
5.   The Iranian government moving too closely to Israel or the United 
States.146 
None of these are directly militarily related, but, they define the Iranian national 
identity that must be considered while formulating a strategy to deal with Iran. 
But what intervention can be made against a nascent nuclear threat?  Particularly 
in light of a region hesitant to accept United States involvement?  Significant confidence 
building measures would need to be implemented to ensure that both the state being 
protected and Iran would know that any nuclear attack against one, or even the threat 
thereof, would lead to a similar retaliation by the United States.  This would require 
unambiguous statements outlining the United States’ resolve in the region, including 
nuclear deterrence. 
A deeper involvement by the United States in regional security affairs will 
complicate the American military’s role in the Arabian Gulf and raise the potential risks 
of a long-term presence.  Such involvement will also challenge America to strengthen its 
regional deterrent capability and to reassure allies─without contributing to regional 
tensions.147 
One aspect of these tensions would be where the nuclear weapons were placed in 
the region to deter Iran.  Basing these weapons in countries in the region will cause 
problems for the very regimes they are meant to protect, and keeping them outside the 
region could cast doubts over American commitments.  A clear and public outlining of 
this policy would be required, possibly revealing more about American strategy than it 
would like. 
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There will be a side benefit to this nuclear protection.  The threat that Iraq poses 
to its neighbors will be mitigated by the interdependence upon the United States’ nuclear 
umbrella protection.  Through Iraq may pose a threat to the GCC countries in the future, 
past history of American intervention, along with reliance upon the U.S.’s good graces 
for deterrence of Iran, will keep Tehran in line.  Also, such a relationship will relieve 
Israeli concerns over additional weapons programs in the region.  The result would likely 
be a reduction in threats against friendly states in the region and the securing of free 
access to regional oil supplies, resulting in greater stability throughout the region. 
F. CONCLUSION 
What will the Arab Gulf States reaction to a nuclear Iran be?  In the face of 
historic actions, both recent and ancient, predicting with some clarity the regional 
response is possible.  Gulf Arab States will seek an expansion of security ties with the 
United States to balance their needs against an Iranian threat. 
Iran, as a status-quo power, will likely continue to avoid direct confrontation with 
the United States.  Tehran will seek a peace dividend from these weapons and attempt to 
reduce its military forces in an effort to stabilize its economic woes.  This will reduce 
regional tensions, as Iran will be less willing to risk confrontation. 
Iran will rely on the traditional security created through the non-use of its nuclear 
weapons.  Of course, there remains the possibility that Tehran will resume its post-
revolutionary intransigence.  More probably, however, with the United States or NATO 
directly involved in a clearly defined deterrent relationship with the Gulf States, Tehran 
will behave cautiously, as it has in the past with America. 
Of key concern is what path the new government of Iraq will take.  If the Shi’a 
majority emerges as the controlling power in the country, this event will be 
groundbreaking.  Although regionally and historically significant, such an even does not 
mean immediate ties will emerge with Iran.  Instead, Iraq will be preoccupied with 
reforming its post-Saddam infrastructure.  The United States, as part of its commitment to 
regional security, offer guarantees that will alleviate the GCC’s concerns over future Iraqi 
and Iranian intransigence.  So long as there is a need for oil, the United States will seek 
security in the region. 
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The requirement of the United States to extend a deterrence umbrella over the 
region will be the most significant impact.  This is necessary to prevent other nuclear 
powers, such as the PRC or India, from replacing American influence in the area.  It is 
also necessary to prevent the states under the umbrella from undertaking nuclear weapons 
programs of their own.  What shape this umbrella relationship will take is uncertain.  It 
could range from a simple state-to-state understanding or a blanket deterrence program, 
such as an extension of NATO’s protection.   Regardless, given global reliance upon Gulf 
oil, and the United States’ role as sole provider of sufficient security, this effort must be 
undertaken.  The stability that is realized from extending a nuclear umbrella buttresses 
the view of the Nuclear Optimists: That the gradual increase in nuclear states surpasses 
































































IV. PAKISTANI REACTION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Any future nuclear conflict is likely to take place in South Asia.  Pakistan and 
India, although apparently at peace, have a history of violence rarely seen between two 
neighboring states.  The shared animosity has escalated in both ferocity and destructive 
potential.  This escalation started shortly after independence in 1947 with the first of 
several wars and shows no sign of reducing in destructive potential.  Even more 
disconcerting, these crises have been occurring even more frequently in the past decade.  
In fact, one is hard-pressed to find three years of peace.  Injecting a nuclear-armed Iran 
into the picture will add tension to an already strained situation. 
In this mutually hostile environment, based upon the two protagonists’ behaviors, 
one can see the potential for a nuclear Iran coexisting with its neighbors.  If two nuclear, 
highly adversarial states such as India and Pakistan are able to avoid nuclear conflict 
through deterrence, the same is potentially true for Iran and its enemies.  That there is no-
where near the level of animosity between Iran and its enemies further supports the 
assertion that a nuclear-armed Iran will not use its weapons and will gain additional 
security through their non-use. 
Considering this situation, Pakistan’s reaction to Iran’s nuclearization, compared 
to the rest of the region, is unlikely to generate conflict.  Both states share factors that 
bring them together and, though there are potential contentions, none approaches a threat 
to either’s national security that would provoke nuclear crisis. 
As Iran’s only nuclear neighbor, Pakistan will watch Tehran’s actions intently.  
Despite cordial relations between the two states, there are conflicts.  Both differ over 
regional issues, which are unlikely to produce any manner of conflict, but they are 
concerns that must be addressed.  Even if the two states became vehement enemies, 
Pakistan’s capabilities are seriously limited in ability to do anything about Iran, and Iran 
has little it could desire from Pakistan.  Solely focusing on India and concerns over New 
Delhi’s military superiority, Islamabad cannot afford to divert forces to contend with an  
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Iranian crisis.  Sunni Pakistan is hardly pleased to see a nuclear, Shi’a Iran, but the only 
option available to Islamabad is to accept it and to enter an understanding with Tehran to 
avoid nuclear misunderstandings.148 
This chapter addresses the question of how Pakistan will react to Iranian 
acquisition of nuclear weapons.  This chapter also asserts Pakistan will be unable to 
interfere with Iran building a nuclear infrastructure.  Further, when both states create a 
deterrent relationship, Islamabad will be able to shift its focus to other issues, essentially 
removing any threat to its national security from Iran through the inconceivable 
consideration of nuclear destruction.  Pakistan will continue to monitor Iranian nuclear 
activities to ensure they are not a threat.  So long as both understand the other’s 
intentions, misinterpretation will be avoided. 
Officially, Islamabad’s stance is that Iran should not have nuclear weapons, but it 
is delicate in its statements.  President Musharraf of Pakistan stated in January of 2006: 
Every country has the right to defend its security if its security is 
threatened. So, technically, I would say if Iran's security is threatened, 
then they have the right to go nuclear. Under the present circumstances, I 
don't think their security is threatened. Therefore, I presume they need not 
go nuclear,149 
President Musharraf justifies Pakistan’s possession of nuclear weapons, but he 
stops short of conceding that Iran has a legitimate threat to its survival, an India for 
example, necessitating nuclear weapons for the state’s survival.  In spite of this stance, 
Pakistan appears unwilling to prevent Tehran from nuclearization, or to react negatively 
once it does. 
This chapter begins by examining the political situation in both states, exploring 
their policies toward one another.  Second, this chapter looks at the various issues 
between Iran and Pakistan, assessing the level of concern each has.  The chapter gauges if 
these issues could reach the threshold of nuclear exchange.  Third, this chapter examines 
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Pakistan’s ability to respond to such issues, by considering current and future issues 
facing Islamabad.  Finally, this chapter assesses the impact of Pakistan’s reaction upon 
U.S. interests. 
B. ISSUES BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND IRAN 
Seemingly in perpetuity, Pakistan has focused most, if not all, of its energies 
against India.  This single-mindedness leaves Islamabad with little time, and fewer 
resources, to consider any other issue as more critical.  Inequality remains the paradigm 
for conventional force structures between Pakistan and India, despite Islamabad’s 
struggle to achieve parity with India’s superiority in nearly every category of military 
hardware.150  In response, Pakistan has naturally sought the security that nuclear weapons 
confer.  The balance of Pakistan’s forces have been aligned to threaten unacceptable 
levels of damage on India if one of Pakistan’s red lines should be crossed.  According to 
Professor Stephen P. Cohen of the Brookings Institution:  
Pakistan is now less able to handle the consequences of a major war (or 
significant natural disaster) that it was ten or twenty years ago.  The 
confidence of core elites in the future of Pakistan is reduced, the economic 
situation more uncertain, and Pakistan’s military position, despite the 
bomb, is less secure than it was then.  Further, many of Pakistan’s 
institutions, including the army, are weaker now.  In brief, the shock of 
even a limited war or other major disaster would be greater than it would 
have been 10 years ago.151 
Since Pakistan’s founding in 1947, its relations with Iran have fluctuated.  Both 
had very close relations in the days of the Shah, but the 1979 Islamic Revolution soured 
these with the rise of Khomeini. 152  Since then relations could not be considered close.  
Both states find commonality in cultural and religious ties, yet the continued paranoia of 
Shi’ites in Iran with the sustained prominence of Sunnis throughout the world is a very 
serious source of strife, difficult to alleviate.  
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Any of a number of issues could spark a serious conflict between Pakistan and 
Iran, but these issues are not serious enough to cause conflict, much less cross the nuclear 
threshold.  To understand Pakistan’s reaction to Iran’s nuclearization, one must 
understand each issue as perceived by each nation. First, since each supported opposing 
factions in Afghanistan, the future of that state is of great concern to both.  Both Iran and 
Pakistan will watch very closely as Kabul progresses toward control and reconstruction.  
Second, C2 of each state’s nuclear weapons requires study, as a misunderstanding of each 
state’s respective nuclear doctrines could produce serious problems.  Third, Iranian ties to 
Pakistan’s nemesis, India, causes tension.  Pakistan’s continuing close ties to the PRC has 
long been a source of contention for India, which has been overstated at times.  This issue 
remains a potential source of conflict.  Finally, Pakistan’s support of the American-led 
global war on terror (GWOT), and Iranian fears it is next on Washington’s list after Iraq, 
are issues of contention.  Accurately assessing what might happen if these nations reach 
the nuclear boundary is difficult, but based upon past incidents and recent moderation, 
perhaps the situation can safely be reduced to, at worst, the level of non-nuclear conflict. 
1.  Afghanistan 
Since its founding, Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan has been a source of  
struggle by proxy between Tehran and Islamabad.153  In the wake of the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan in 1979, Pakistan became a conduit for support to the Mujahedin.  Both 
states backed their respective sects of Islam in the civil war for control of the country 
after the fall of the Soviet-backed regime.  Iran supported the Shi’a elements and the 
Northern Alliance and Pakistan’s Interservice Intelligence Directorate (ISID), the 
Taliban.  Due to the Taliban’s distorted practices of Islam, its conquest of most of the 
country led to a downward spiral between Iran and Afghanistan.  This animus culminated 
in an infamous 1998 incident in which the Taliban murdered seven Iranian diplomats in 
Afghanistan.  The ensuing war of words between Iran and Afghanistan escalated nearly 
to conflict.154  This conflict would have drawn Pakistan in because Islamabad sought to 
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protect its interests.155  Current tensions concerning Afghanistan center on an appropriate 
level (25 percent) of participation by Shi’as in Kabul.156  India’s improved relations with 
Afghanistan reduce Pakistan’s influence over Kabul and help prevent the rise of another 
Taliban, which, prior to its removal in 2001, caused significant problems for India.157  
Lastly, stability along the Afghanistan/Pakistan border could arise, inducing a potential 
resurgence by Pashtuns (the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan) to create a formalized 
Pashtunistan, cutting off the western half of Pakistan.158 
As serious as the above issues could potentially become, none comes close to 
causing a serious crisis between Iran and Pakistan that would foment military action.  
Both sides have an interest in a stable and reconstructed Afghanistan.  Both sides are 
concerned about the future form the state will take.  As such, there are no significantly 
divisive issues to warrant open conflict.  Iran may fear for the safety and representation 
for the Shi’a minority, but no indication exists that they are in danger.  Indeed, as 
mentioned in Chapter III, Iran has routinely ignored the suffering of Muslims in other 
nations in pursuit of its political ends.  Overall, no indication exists that these concerns 
would escalate beyond fighting in Afghanistan to reach across the Iran-Pakistan border; 
much less a nuclear exchange. 
2. India 
Iran’s friendly ties to India are a source of antagonism between Pakistan and both 
states.  In the wake of recent peace initiatives with India, these concerns are relatively 
benign.  Nevertheless, deep-seated suspicion will remain.  Among the key issues are the 
final resolution on each state’s claim toward Kashmir, continued terrorism within both 
states (perceived to be initiated by the other), the question over land ceded in 1964 to the 
PRC by Pakistan (land that India does not recognize), and shared mistrust that has 
seethed since independence.159 
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The recent increasing goodwill between India and Pakistan balances these 
tensions.160  President Musharraf’s authorization to construct a pipeline from Iran, across 
Pakistan, to India, is the most significant example of peace breaking out.161  Far from 
ending all animosity, the increasing interdependence could serve as a deterrent against 
conflict.  As construction begins, scheduled for early 2006 with completion set for 2009, 
for no other reason than profit, this peace process will likely continue.  There have been a 
variety of delays initiating the pipelines construction.  Most prominent of these is U.S. 
pressure on India and Pakistan to end their support to avert Iran from gaining income.  
There is plenty of reason for all parties to support the pipeline, with an end result of 
increased flow of capital as well as much needed natural gas into the rapidly growing 
markets. 
Iran’s role is as a cog in the apparent efforts by India to encircle Pakistan─similar 
to New Delhi’s efforts in Afghanistan.  If Iran used its influence, along with India in 
Afghanistan, this would heighten feelings of Pakistan standing alone against a host of 
enemies surrounding it.  This, in addition to concerns with India, serves as the greatest 
potential risk for nuclear exchange between states resulting from Iran’s new weapons.  
Islamabad, conscious of New Delhi attempting to encircle it with allies, will view any 
alliance with Tehran as a serious threat. 
Assuming the worst case in this situation, that the peace process degrades and 
both sides withdraw to their corners,  Pakistan would feel much as it has in the past: alone 
and surrounded.  Islamabad would feel compelled to act in a deterrent manner toward 
Iran’s stockpile of weapons.  Pakistan would essentially dig in and target both enemies 
with an accelerated weapons program to increase its stockpile to account for the targets in 
Iran and perhaps press for additional purchases of missile and aircraft to engage with a 
new nuclear adversary.  Of course, there would also be significant effort to de-escalate on 
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both sides.  Also the international community would become involved, as it has in the 
past.  In the end, none of the parties want nuclear war. 
Realistically, Pakistan is stretched too thin to do much of anything against an 
emerging Iranian nuclear stockpile, be it friendly, moderately aligned with India, or 
adversarial.  Islamabad could allow the United States to act against Iran by using 
Pakistani airspace as a route for attack, but the Pakistani population would react violently 
against this.  Islamabad has been very cautious about allowing the United States to carry 
out military actions within Pakistan because of its public’s aversion to Washington’s 
actions.  A recent example is the outcry against an American operation to kill Ayman 
Zawahiri, Al-Qaeda’s number two man, within Pakistan.162 
Pakistan’s current focus on economic growth and deterrence of India, in spite of 
the recent turn toward better relations, would force Pakistan to accept Iran’s new 
capabilities because they could not do anything substantive about it.  Accordingly, an 
understanding of deterrence would be created between Pakistan and Iran.  Neither state 
has anything that the other wants that is worth the risk of nuclear exchange.  Iran will not 
seek to seize the relatively worthless desert region of Baluchistan, and it would be almost 
impossible for Pakistan to seize Iran’s petroleum assets militarily. 
There is evidence that Pakistan has been, if not endorsing of Iranian weapons, less 
than vigilant over its own nuclear technology.  Reports of technology transfers from 
Pakistan to Iran aiding Tehran’s reprocessing of highly enriched uranium through A.Q. 
Khan, the father of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, nuclear proliferation network 
surfaced in 2005.163  This apparent ambivalence toward proliferation suggests that 
President Musharraf, and all of Pakistan, at least tacitly approves of A.Q. Khan’s 
activities, although the government is forced by the international community to do 
something about it.  A.Q. Khan can hardly be considered to have worked with the 
permission of his government, his lax punishment, simply being put under house arrest, 
that Islamabad is left open to speculation about just how concerned it is about a nuclear 
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Iran.164  A.Q. Khan remains perhaps the greatest hero that state has ever had, second only 
to Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Pakistan’s founding father.165 
3. C2 
Investigating how Iran and Pakistan will manage their respective C2 systems 
indicate of how potentially stabilizing the addition of Iranian nuclear weapons will be.  
An effective C2 organization is the core of a credible deterrent structure.166  With clear, 
established red lines for use and transparent security protocols, both would profit greatly 
from avoiding any misunderstanding.  However this will take much work to establish a 
mutually deterring relationship─particularly in light of Iran’s close ties to India. 
Whereas Pakistan has hand-on training in following its C2 principles, Iran will be 
pressed to learn quickly.  The serious nature of mishandling these weapons, along with 
the calculating nature of the regime in Tehran, little suggests it would not manage its 
weapons in a responsible manner. 
As previously discussed in Chapter I, the IRGC will likely gain control over 
Iran’s nuclear weapons.  This is cause for concern, owing to its history of acting beyond 
the scope of Tehran’s orders.  However, as the mullahs must rely upon the IRGC for 
regime support, it is improbable that they would give the IRGC control of nuclear 
weapons without sufficient safeguards to avoid unauthorized use.  Iran has some learning 
to do as it gains nuclear capabilities, but this need not be a major issue for regional 
security.  Scholars have written countless studies on how exactly nuclear deterrence 
works between states.  It should not be overly difficult for Tehran to integrate the lessons 
of sixty years of deterrence theorizing into its own nuclear C2 procedures. 
Pakistan has the benefit of experience in exercising control over its weapons.  
Despite this, concerns remain.  Pakistani weapons, for example, are probably not fitted 
with Permissive Action Links (PALS), which require a specific code to be entered prior 
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to detonation.  This security feature ensures control over the weapons is maintained by 
those in government entrusted with nuclear release authority and not local ground 
commanders who may use them without permission.  Lieutenant General Kidwai of the 
Strategic Plans Division, in charge of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, has stated that the state 
does not require PALS, owing to the disassembled nature of its weapons.   
Pakistan’s disassembled arsenal inherently provides stability, preventing rapid, 
potentially irrational and uninformed employment, by requiring a certain amount of time 
prior to their use.  This lag time provides additional security by protecting against instant, 
potentially unnecessary use of the weapons.  Concerns remain in Pakistan about 
Indian/Iranian ties─ties that have yet to manifest into a serious threat.  In spite of Iran and 
India supporting each other with military aid, no indication exists that both are prepared 
to enter into a coordinated deterrence relationship against Islamabad that would mitigate 
Pakistan’s nuclear security.  
In the case of Iran and Pakistan’s C2 issue, apprehension by outside states is 
justified, but not undue concern.  The decades of construction have given Iran much 
needed time to prepare for the eventual acquisition of the weapons.  This “nuclear 
learning,” as Dr. James Wirtz of the Naval Postgraduate School calls it, allows for greater 
stability through intellectual, doctrinal, and political understanding.167  Both the 
Pakistanis and Indians have, through their exchange of nuclear threats and brinkmanship, 
come to gain an in-depth understanding of just how far either could push a nuclear crisis.  
Similarly, Pakistan has formulated a national command authority, adding stability to its 
C2 program.  Taken together, along with the inherent security that nuclear weapons 
provide, Islamabad is on the right pathway to enhance security through credible controls 
over its nuclear weapons.  Iran would quickly follow, understanding that it has nothing to 
gain by tensions with Pakistan.  Pakistan would not harbor serious concerns either, for 
just as Islamabad’s weapons are not meant for Tehran, Tehran’s will not be meant for 
Islamabad.168  Even in a crisis where anxiety can cloud judgment, this basic 
understanding will prevent unintended nuclear use. 
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4. THE PRC 
India has been seeking to exploit Pakistani tensions with Iran and Afghanistan for 
decades.  Similarly, Pakistan has used its relationship with the PRC to support its aims 
and to threaten India.  In a relationship dating back to its independence, Pakistan has 
cultivated close ties with the PRC, seeking security guarantees, legitimacy, and access to 
relatively modern military hardware in an attempt to stave off India’s superiority. 
The hallmark of this bond is the ceding of land to the PRC in the Sino-Pakistan 
land agreement of 1963 in which Pakistan turned over nearly 5,200 square kilometers of 
land to the PRC.  This land, part of the disputed region of Jammu and Kashmir, cemented 
the already good relations between the two states.  Though the PRC has provided high-
tech weapons, most notably missiles, its role in directly intervening between Pakistan and 
India is virtually non-existent.169  Instead, Beijing is satisfied in sustaining its interests 
through material, rather than human aid.  
A perfect example of this is the PRC’s support in developing the port facilities at 
Gwadar, Pakistan.  As a developing country, the PRC requires huge amounts of energy 
supplies.  In recent years, Beijing has sought to secure the ever shrinking amount of 
global petroleum production.   Iran serves to fill part of this role: the PRC has financially 
backed the first phase of the development of Gwadar Port into an expanded site of 
transshipment of goods.  Gwadar is not necessarily a military port, but its location at the 
mouth of the Gulf of Oman allows surveillance of this vital sea lane out of the Arabian 
Gulf.  Future development and potential militarization of Gwadar furthers the PRC’s 
interest to secure oil supplies.170 
The continuing good relations between Pakistan and the PRC will serve as a 
source of irritation for India, its traditional rival.  No indication exists that Iran, in 
acquiring nuclear weapons, would cause a conflict in any way over the good relations 
that Pakistan and the PRC have.  Nor would it remove the irritation that the PRC causes 
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India.  Iran has no territorial aspirations on the PRC’s interests, nor would its economic 
interests be served by tensions between one of its largest customers and its neighbor. 
5. Pakistan and the Global War on Terror (GWOT) 
As a major, non-NATO ally, Pakistan has been a reluctant supporter of the 
removal of the Taliban and furtherance of Americas GWOT.  This apprehension comes 
from several directions: fear of a strengthened Afghanistan that could potentially press 
for a radical shift to the Durand Line, an Iranian dominated Shi’a state, not to mention 
domestic issues supporting the very fundamentalist folk heroes that America is fighting.  
Historically, Pakistan is aware of the vacillating nature of U.S. support during times of 
need.  As a result, Islamabad will remain wary of American assurances. 
Though the future success of GWOT remains uncertain, some factors could ignite 
problems between Pakistan and Iran.  Iran has announced that it has certain al Qaeda 
members in its country, reportedly under arrest.  Their presence suggests that Iran could 
use them as a source of leverage over the United States.171  Iran remains on the U.S. State 
Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism and is a potential target in the future 
execution of GWOT.  The government of Pakistan, not eager to be seen as supporting the 
United States against a Muslim nation, would likely not have a serious problem if 
America were to conduct some sort of operation to seize the al Qaeda members inside 
Iran.172  How this would be managed in the face of an Iranian nuclear deterrent is 
uncertain, though the killing or capturing of these terrorists would not warrant an Iranian 
nuclear response.  Nor is any action in GWOT that Pakistan supports likely to rise to the 
nuclear threshold.  The followers of al Qaeda, being mostly Sunni and Saudi in origin 
(Iran’s avowed spiritual enemy), are distasteful individuals to the regime in Tehran.  Iran 
is unlikely to be supportive of handing over Muslims to American allied hands, and they 
certainly will not risk nuclear exchange over it. 
C. IMPACT ON U.S. INTERESTS 
As discussed above, Pakistan will have a relatively benign reaction to Iran’s 
nuclearization.  Pakistan will not welcome a rival to its claim as the only Muslim nuclear 
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state.  The fact that Iran is Shi’a will increase this discomfort throughout the mostly 
Sunni Muslim world; however, neither of these factors will place undue pressure on the 
relations, good or bad between Pakistan and Iran.  Similarly, the impact on the interests 
of the United States will be marginal, compared to other issues covered by this thesis. 
The United States depends upon Pakistan for access to Afghanistan and support 
for GWOT throughout the region.  The addition of a nuclear Iran on its border may lead 
to Iran pressing Pakistan to limit or even to cease its support to GWOT.  Nevertheless, 
Pakistan as a Major non-NATO ally will likely value its security relations with the United 
States over Iran’s requests or pressure.  Further, any attempt by Iran to influence 
Pakistan’s relationship with the United States will be reacted to harshly by the latter. 
However, Pakistan’s support to the United States has limits.  Because of internal 
political restrictions, Pakistan will not openly support military action against Iran’s 
nuclear program.  Pakistani involvement therein would invite threats to President 
Musharraf who already deals with internal dissent toward his policies supporting the 
United States.  Furthermore, Islamabad depends on Iran for income.  President Musharraf 
has asserted that Pakistan needs the planned pipeline.  This action will continue in spite 
of the wishes of the United States to deny Tehran the income from it.173 
Could the situation deteriorate to a nuclear crisis requiring the United States to 
intervene?  Possibly, but this would run counter to how nuclear weapons have been 
historically used.  Any adventurism that could lead to conflict would be diminished by 
the threat of a nuclear exchange.  Therefore, the impact on the interests of the United 
States in Pakistan will be minor, limited to a reshuffling of priorities and strategic 
outlooks.  Any issue between the Iran and Pakistan will be seriously curtailed by each 
country’s inherent ability to respond with nuclear weapons and the lack of any serious 
issue that reaches that threshold. 
D.  CONCLUSION 
Nuclear weapons represent a new level of warfare, raising the severity of 
miscalculation to an unacceptable level of loss.  This forces state leaders to consider their  
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actions carefully in the face of nuclear-armed antagonists.  The introduction of a nuclear 
Iran is bound to provoke significant tensions within the international community, but 
these need not be entirely negative. 
What Professor Richard Lebow of Dartmouth University describes as the “long 
peace” was partially due to the stability that nuclear weapons bring.174  Two belligerents 
who have these weapons and are ready to use them, knowing that if either does, it will 
spell disaster for both, have inherent peace of mind and a solution to their security 
dilemma.  Deterrence is not terribly difficult to create, as Pakistan has learned.  Once 
achieved, it provides stability, security, and as in Pakistan’s case, significant economic 
benefit. 
This chapter looked at Pakistan’s reaction to Iran acquiring nuclear weapons.  
Fundamentally, while Pakistan will not be elated, it will tacitly accept it.  First because 
there is very little that Islamabad could do to prevent Iran from acquiring them.  Second, 
save for a fundamental shift of relations between India and Iran, there is no specific issue 
that is likely to lead to escalation and their use.  Both have C2 issues for which perhaps 
each could support the other, leading to closer ties and an understanding of just what 
these weapons mean and how they are meant to be used.   
Nevertheless, in the absolutely worst case scenario, were tensions to rise and Iran 
and Pakistan were to suffer a serious degradation in relations, the outcome would be even 
more certain.  Nuclear weapons provide the ultimate guarantee of state security.  The 
deterrence that evolves from mutual possession of nuclear weapons, assuming stable 
control mechanisms, in the end produces a safer, more secure situation.  All of these 
points further support the arguments made by the Nuclear Optimists that the gradual 
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A. SUMMARY: IS THE SKY FALLING? 
This thesis surveys the scope of likely regional reactions to a nuclear-armed Iran.  
Although the prospect of not acting to prevent Tehran from possessing nuclear weapons 
is hard to accept, this thesis shows the impact will not have the far-reaching regional 
security consequences that are feared.  For sure, some measure of reaction will be 
necessary to ensure that Iran does not become overly belligerent toward other states.  
Nonetheless, there is no need to irritate and to provoke an already paranoid Tehran.  This 
is especially true since Iran will obtain nuclear weapons no matter what actions are taken 
against it.  The focus should be on deterring Iran from misbehaving with its new abilities 
and preventing other nations from rapid proliferation.  It must be stated that this thesis 
does not advocate appeasement.  Iran will definitely acquire nuclear weapons, and what it 
does with them afterwards will be directly influenced by how Tehran is treated.   
This thesis surveyed the states most immediately impacted by Iran’s 
nuclearization, Israel, the Gulf Arab States, and Pakistan.  This thesis also assessed the 
impact of this potential event and the reaction of those states.  Based on these likely 
reactions, there is little to suggest that a nuclear Iran will seriously weaken the status-quo 
of the Arabian Gulf Region.  The options available to each state or states runs the gamut 
of militarily striking Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, acquiring nuclear weapons in response 
to Tehran’s program, seeking outside help to counter Iran’s capability, or simply doing 
nothing.  The likely course of action of the states studied in this thesis suggests the end 
result will not be escalating belligerency that violates the nuclear taboo.  Regional 
tensions may increase with Iran’s revelation as a nuclear state, but these will fade with 
the creation of a stable deterrence framework.  This stability will further support the 
Nuclear Optimist’s argument that additional nuclear states prevent conflict and increase 
security, as will be seen through this new deterrent framework.  Deterrence is a proven 
institution with over sixty years of radical international behavior to prove it is effective. 
Israel will be very concerned at the prospect of its most vocal enemy gaining a 
nuclear capability.  Yet this overlooks the fact that Pakistan, a relatively unstable Muslim 
nation, has possessed nuclear weapons for years without being a threat to Israel.  
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Jerusalem took military action to prevent Iraq from going nuclear; nonetheless, the merits 
of this operation, and the likely success of one against Iran, are dubious.  Perhaps through 
a third party, the two states will enter into a mutually deterring relationship in which, if 
one attacks the other, the attacker will suffer an unacceptable level of damage in return.  
This understanding would increase stability between the two, as both would be reluctant 
to risk escalation. 
Similarly, the Arab Gulf States will be anxious about Iran’s new capability.  None 
of these possesses nuclear programs, leaving them open to intimidation by the long hated 
Persian enemy.  Differences between the two sides run deep and there is a history of 
shared animosity that spans millennia.  The Gulf States will be tempted to launch nuclear 
programs of their own.  Of course, initiating a program would be time consuming, and  it 
would be relatively easy for the international community to detect and to eliminate.  As 
an alternative to creating their own weapons, these states will require assurances on the 
part of the international community that Iran will not be allowed to interfere with their 
governments, as Tehran did following the 1979 Islamic Revolution.  These states will 
likely continue their practice of outsourcing their security to world powers and expand it 
to contend with Iran’s new capability. 
A nuclear Iran concerns Pakistan, but it is very limited in its ability to respond.  
Preoccupied by its ongoing issues with India, Pakistan is unable to match Tehran’s 
emerging capability militarily.  Nor is there much reason for Islamabad to be seriously 
worried.  Of the issues that the two nations are in contention over, none comes close to 
breaching the nuclear threshold.  Islamabad’s likely response to Iran’s nuclearization 
would be simply to make its intentions and C2 procedures clear to avoid any 
miscommunication or misunderstanding. 
Based upon the expected reaction of each of these states, the sky is clearly not 
falling with Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons.  Although Tehran’s behavior will 
shift, it will presumably not act in an overly provocative manner.  Steps must be taken by 
the United States to ensure this, but in the end, a nuclear Iran will not equate to a volatile 
disruption of the current situation in the Arabian Gulf. 
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B. FINDINGS FROM THIS STUDY 
This thesis suggests that there are reasons to be concerned about Iranian nuclear 
weapons, yet it is clearly not the crisis that many fear.  Instead, the situation requires 
careful calculation of how this new capability will alter the Arabian Gulf region.  Such 
considerations include: 
• Though not an ideal circumstance, Iran will almost certainly gain the 
capability to build nuclear weapons. 
• Iranian nuclear weapons will add a higher level of concern by all regional 
parties, but they are meant to add security, not overtly threaten its 
neighborhood.   Tehran’s nuclear weapons will not fundamentally shift the 
balance of power nor overly impact issues already of concern in the area.  
States in the region may lose some sense of security, as this thesis has 
shown, but each security dilemma can be resolved by either each nation’s 
own capability or that of an outside power.  The result will not be a net 
shift toward instability. 
• Considering the historical control of WMD in the IRGC, Iran’s nuclear 
weapons will likely be placed under the IRGC’s control.  This is cause for 
concern over Iran’s C2 issues, but Tehran will appreciate the 
responsibilities that come from possession of these weapons and not allow 
those in possession of the weapons to act rashly.  As the ultimate 
guarantor of Iran’s regime survival, control will be kept on a tight leash.  
For as history has proved, nuclear weapons, with their extreme destructive 
power, induce caution, not irrational action.175   
• Reflecting on the past denial of WMD to terrorist groups, Iran would 
unlikely change this policy with its acquisition of nuclear weapons. 
C. ISSUES ARISING FROM FINDINGS 
Based upon these findings, a number of issues beyond the scope of this thesis 
require consideration.  The extent of these are far reaching and uncertain, but, no doubt, 
how they are addressed will be critical in the pursuit of U.S. security interests. 
1. Iran’s Emergence as a Nuclear State  
The manner in which Iran emerges as a nuclear power will be critical as to how 
the region reacts.  Following the Nuclear Optimist’s approach of the gradual addition of 
nuclear states, ideally, Iran’s capability will be relatively transparent.  In spite of Tehran’s 
reluctance to share its true nuclear intentions, the intelligence community should be able 
to predict accurately, within a reasonable timeframe, when Iran can be expected to 
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emerge with its new capability.  With this knowledge, steps can be taken by the United 
States and international organizations to react in a controlled manner, reducing the 
likelihood of the region becoming thrown into uncertainty and panic.  The day Iran 
acquires nuclear capabilities will be interesting, but not necessarily a crisis. 
If Iran suddenly and unpredictably emerged as a nuclear power, the opposite may 
be true.  If Tehran surprised the world with a nuclear test, the world would react with 
universal shock, leading to irrational decisions by heads of state.  Those states in the 
Gulf, failing to have security guarantees from the United States, could initiate their own 
programs, seek to purchase weapons from abroad, crumble under Iranian demands, or in 
the worst case, have an outside state attempt to destroy Iran’s nuclear infrastructure 
preemptively, inviting nuclear conflict in the region.  Clearly, it is in Iran’s interest not to 
allow such chaos to reign. 
The impact that a nuclear Iran will have on the debate surrounding nuclear 
proliferation will provide additional input into which side of the argument is correct.  The 
nuclear taboo will surely be kept in place, and Tehran will be able to enjoy an additional 
measure of security against its adversaries.  As events unfold and states react to this new 
capability, the Nuclear Optimist’s point of view will likely be upheld─since it is very 
unlikely that Iran will use its weapons, or that nuclear states will attack a nuclear Iran.  
The end result from Iran gaining nuclear weapons will be additional support for the slow, 
relatively controlled, proliferation of nuclear weapons. 
2.  Policy Implications  
Iran’s emergence as a nuclear state will have long reaching policy implications for 
the United States and the international community. 
a.  The NPT 
Iran going nuclear while still within the boundaries of the NPT engenders 
significant concerns about the future of nuclear proliferation control.   If the international 
community is unable to prevent signatories from adhering to the treaty, the treaty will be 
deemed essentially valueless.  First, North Korea went nuclear, largely while under the 
NPT, next Iran following in its footsteps.  The dam may very well burst if several other 
states follow Iran’s example, particularly in response to the lack of international resolve 
to end Tehran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons.   Foreign policy must be amended to prevent 
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others from violating the treaty.  It is too late for Iran, but this is not the case for most 
other nations, with appropriate enforcement.   
b.  U.S. Loss of Credibility 
The United States has made it clear that a nuclear Iran is unacceptable.  
When Iran gains nuclear weapons, America will lose credibility world wide.  This loss 
will reduce its ability to prevent other states from pursuing nuclear weapons.  How this 
loss of international prestige can be regained is not immediately predictable. 
c.  Alliance Cohesion 
The cohesion of alliances so carefully nurtured since World War II could 
weaken in the future.  The United States has placed great emphasis upon forming 
coalitions to pursue its foreign policy, but unfortunately, loss of credibility through faulty 
intelligence leading to the invasion of Iraq will haunt America for years.  Iran going 
nuclear against the stated policy of the United States could cause key allies to question 
the commitments of other policies by Washington D.C.  Repairing this loss will take time 
and could severely undermine the ability of the United States to act as it would normally 
find support for.  To avoid the negative impact upon alliances, the United States must act 
vigorously and wisely against Iran’s emerging nuclear capability, leading the 
international community to ensure that Tehran does not use its newly gained weapons to 
threaten the status-quo in the Arabian Gulf region. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE U.S. 
As the sole remaining superpower and guarantor of stability in the region since 
1971, the United States cannot simply watch Iran and do nothing.  Clearly a response is 
necessary, or Iran may behave irresponsibly with its weapons, and other states may find 
incentive to seek their own weapons.  Preventative military strikes are a very difficult 
option, with serious concerns about their long-term success, and other options are also 
available to contend with Iran.   Certain steps must be taken to motivate Iran to act 
rationally with its nuclear weapons. 
A nuclear Iran will require greater involvement by the United States to secure the 
Arabian Gulf region.  To prevent further proliferation, non-nuclear states must be given 
ample and unquestionable reasons why they should trust the security offered by the  
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United States.  Without question, it must be the United States which acts, for no other 
state has the military power or prestige to elicit respect and adhesion to security 
guarantees. 
At the appropriate time, the United States, possibly in concert with NATO, should 
offer blanket nuclear deterrence assurances, similar to those given to Western Europe 
throughout the Cold War, to the Arab Gulf States as well as to Israel and Pakistan, if 
deemed necessary.  This agreement would assert that any nuclear attack by Iran would be 
considered an attack on the United States.  Any such guarantee will require significant 
assurances of commitment.  It may also require public statements that nuclear weapons 
will not be stored in Islamic countries, or possibly the basing of these in the region 
specifically, whichever will bring the most credibility.  Such a structure would in effect 
remove the threat of Iran’s weapons, allowing issues under the threshold of use to be 
managed as if they did not exist.  Of key importance to this concept is that the deterrence 
framework be presented to Iran in a manner that is unambiguously clear to all levels of 
government.   
Also, those states in the region that might be disposed to strike Iran’s facilities 
must be prevented from doing so.  Any attack on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure will drive 
the regime to even greater levels of paranoia.  The outcome, even if the attacks succeed 
would be to convince the regime in Tehran that nuclear weapons are required.  In the end, 
nuclear proliferation is a fact.  How it is managed will determine whether or not it adds or 
detracts from regional security. 
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